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RESTORING THE GRAND JURY
Kevin K. Washburn*
Though it is enshrined in the Constitution, the grand jury is one of the
least respected institutions in American criminal justice today. Scholars
regard the grand jury just as doctors regard the appendix: an organic part
of our constitutional makeup, but not of much use. While scholars have
proposed reforms, most of them seem only loosely related to the
fundamental purpose of the grand jury. In an era of plea bargains, the
grand jury can serve a crucial role in insuring popular legitimacy in the
criminal justice system. In light of the criticism, however, the grand jury
seems to be failing in that role. This Article theorizes that, as the United
States has become more diverse, the grand jury has lost its role as "the
voice of the community. " Since a grand jury functions by majority vote and
is drawn from the entire jurisdiction, the grand jury has lost its role as a
countermajoritarian force of the local community against central authority.
Ironically, the problem may have developed from efforts to insure diverse
representation in criminal justice through unthinking adoption of the
principle that trial juries should be drawn from panels representing a 'fair
cross-section of the community. " As the grand jury has become a
microcosm of the broader melting pot, each community's voice has been
lost amid a cacophony of voices from other communities within the same
jurisdiction. This has harmed citizens in poor and minority communities
where legitimacy issues are most salient. No jurisdiction is just one
community, and no grand jury can serve its purpose of representing a
community if it is drawn from all communities. Grand juries should be
reconstituted so that each grand jury represents an actual community of
people who are likely to share common concerns about local issues of
criminal justice.
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INTRODUCTION
The American criminal justice system has long suffered withering
criticism related to race and discrimination. While such criticism tends to
rise and fall with news cycles and specific incidents with racial overtones,
many communities seem to have a low baseline of trust in the criminal
justice system. For almost as long as Americans have sought to address
racial issues in criminal justice, the jury has figured prominently as part of
the solution. The jury is a natural place to work to address such problems
because it imbues criminal justice with a strong democratic element.'
Jury service provides a concrete opportunity for meaningful participation
by everyday citizens in one of the most important-and high stakes-
activities of government. 2  And through their participation on juries,
ordinary citizens become invested in criminal justice and government itself.
Indeed, it is largely on citizen participation that the legitimacy of the
American criminal justice system rests.
While tremendous attention has been devoted to the trial jury in
addressing problems involving race, scarce attention has been devoted to
the other important American jury, the grand jury. In light of the scarcity of
trials in modem criminal justice, the lack of attention to the grand jury is
unfortunate. The grand jury could play a significant role in restoring the
legitimacy of American criminal justice, particularly in communities of
color that lack trust in the criminal justice system.
Today, the grand jury draws mostly skepticism when it draws any
attention at all. Though enshrined in the Fifth Amendment and praised in
U.S. Supreme Court opinions, it garners very little respect among legal
academics or practitioners. 3 The claim that the average grand jury would
1. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 272-73 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(quoting Alexis de Tocqueville's claim that the use of juries raises the people to the bench
and invests them with the direction of society).
2. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991) ("The opportunity for ordinary
citizens to participate in the administration of justice has long been recognized as one of the
principal justifications for retaining the jury system." (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 147-58 (1968))); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972) ("Fair and effective
law enforcement aimed at providing security for the person and property of the individual is
a fundamental function of government, and the grand jury plays an important,
constitutionally mandated role in this process.").
3. Peter Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary
Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 463, 474 (1980); see
also Susan W. Brenner, The Voice of the Community: A Case for Grand Jury Independence,
3 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 67, 123 (1995) (criticizing the grand jury and arguing for reform);
R. Michael Cassidy, Toward a More Independent Grand Jury: Recasting and Enforcing the
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indict "a ham sandwich," is so commonplace that it has become clich6.4
Consistent with such criticism, critics have implicitly or explicitly urged
abolition of the grand jury5 or, alternatively, have offered ambitious
proposals for reform.6 These proposals range from staffing solutions, such
as giving the grand jury administrative staff or independent legal counsel, 7
to evidentiary and procedural reforms, such as allowing the suspect to
Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 13 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 361, 365
(2000) (noting the "widespread view that this erosion of the grand jury's ability to act as a
check on prosecutorial power is beyond repair"); Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do
Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 260, 323 (1995) ("In almost all
cases, a criminal defendant would be just as well off without the grand jury as he is with
it."); David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home:
What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 Geo. L.J. 683,
690 (2006) ("Today, the grand jury's role makes little sense .... ").
4. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff 55 Stan. L.
Rev. 29, 51 n.70 (2002) (arguing that grand jury review represents, at best, "a modest
screening power, a fact recognized by the familiar courthouse saying that a grand jury would
indict a ham sandwich if the prosecutor asked it to do so"); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The
Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First Principles 166 (1997) (noting that in the law
school classroom, "the only thing said about the grand jury (typically) is that a clever
prosecutor can get it to indict a ham sandwich"); Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding
and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 Yale L.J. 1097, 1171 n.403
(2001) [hereinafter Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding]; Stephanos Bibas, The Real-World Shift in
Criminal Procedure, 93 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 789, 813 n.86 (2003) (reviewing Ronald
Jay Allen et al., Comprehensive Criminal Procedure (2001), and Marc L. Miller & Ronald F.
Wright, Criminal Procedures: Cases, Statutes, and Executive Materials (2001)); Stephanos
Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 911, 929
(2006) [hereinafter Bibas, Transparency]; Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of
Grand Jury Independence, 41 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 2 n.8 (2004). Using a slight twist on the
concept, other scholars have said that a "grand jury would indict a hamburger." Marc L.
Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Criminal Procedures: Prosecution and Adjudication 192 (2d ed.
2005) [hereinafter Miller & Wright, 2005 ed.].
5. See, e.g., William J. Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 174, 182 (1973); see also Brenner, supra note 3, at 123 (noting that one
solution is to abolish the grand jury through constitutional amendment); Cassidy, supra note
3, at 365; Leipold, supra note 3, at 323.
6. See Ric Simmons, Re-examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in
the Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 22, 68-73 (2002); see also Marvin E.
Frankel & Gary P. Naftalis, The Grand Jury: An Institution on Trial 123-26 (1977)
(presenting an earlier proposal for counsel and transcripts); Cassidy, supra note 3, at 393-94
(proposing a reform that would require prosecutors to meet an ethical obligation not to
distort the evidence or mislead the grand jury, which would indirectly require presentation of
exculpatory evidence in many cases); Kuckes, supra note 4, at 17, 22 n.123, 30, 36-37, 66
(proposing reforms that would allow grand jury witnesses to bring counsel into the grand
jury room with them when they testify and would allow them to have transcripts of their
testimony).
7. Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 1169, 1185 (1995) (arguing that we should give the grand jury a staff). Professor Niki
Kuckes argues that the grand jury should be allowed to use the court, rather than the
prosecutor, as its advisor. Kuckes, supra note 4, at 31, 65 ("[G]ive the grand jury an
independent legal adviser, selected from outside of the prosecutor's office."); see also
Brenner, supra note 3, at 124-28 (outlining the advantages of giving a grand jury
independent legal counsel); Ovio C. Lewis, The Grand Jury: A Critical Evaluation, 13
Akron L. Rev. 33, 64 (1979) (noting that the grand jury needs "additional resources, such as
independent legal counsel, investigators, and clerical staff").
2336 [Vol. 76
RESTORING THE GRAND JURY
testify, prohibiting the use of hearsay testimony, forbidding resubmission of
a case after a grand jury has initially declined to indict,8 or requiring
prosecutors to offer more evidence in each case.9
Because many of the grand jury reformers define the principal evil in
modern American criminal justice to be the increased power of the
prosecutor, many seek to change the balance of power between the
prosecutor and the grand jury by empowering the grand jury to become a
stronger check on the prosecutor or by making the indictment process more
difficult for the prosecutor. But the critics' preoccupation with the growth
in prosecutorial power has caused them to overlook the historical purpose
of the grand jury. Indeed, the grand jury was created to deal with a much
more nuanced problem than the one that many academics now ask it to
address.
Historically, the grand jury was heralded because of its ability to serve as
a check by "the people" in the local community on laws imposed by a
central government that was more distant from ordinary citizens.10 The
grand jury was intended by the Anti-Federalists to be a check on federal
authority. As the Supreme Court has looked increasingly toward originalist
interpretations of the Constitution to determine constitutional meaning in
cases involving criminal procedure,"1 the Court could use such an
interpretive lens to restore life to the Fifth Amendment's grand jury
requirement. Today, grand juries rarely serve the purposes envisioned by
the founders.
One need not be an originalist, however, to want to restore power to the
grand jury. A legal realist who is skeptical of the power of the rule of law
and the outcome of court decisions may also see benefits in restoring
decision making to community groups that have a different agenda than
judges.
One recent unusual case vividly demonstrates the importance of the
purpose served by grand juries. Following Hurricane Katrina, the attorney
general of Louisiana demanded prosecution of medical workers who had
remained at a New Orleans hospital with critically ill patients. 12 When
numerous patients died at the hospital while awaiting rescue, the attorney
8. Simmons, supra note 6, at 19, 71.
9. Cassidy, supra note 3, at 393-94 (discussing the duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence).
10. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction
83-86 (1998); Amar, supra note 4.
11. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-43 (2004). See generally
Donald Dripps, Sixth-Amendment Originalism 's Collision Course with a Right to Counsel:
What's Titanic, What's Iceberg? (San Diego Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-79,
2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=952508.
12. Adam Nossiter, Grand Jury Won't Indict Doctor in Hurricane Deaths, N.Y. Times,
July 25, 2007, at A10; see also Gwen Filosa & John Pope, Grand Jury Refuses to Indict
Anna Pou, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), July 25, 2007, at A-1. See generally Gina
Castellano, The Criminalization of Treating End of Life Patients with Risky Pain Medication
and the Role of the Extreme Emergency Situation, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 203 (2007)
(discussing the New Orleans case at length).
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general focused blame on a surgeon and accused her of murdering some of
the patients. 13 When the local district attorney moved slowly to press
charges, the state attorney general began an investigation and ordered a
local grand jury from Orleans Parish to be empanelled to hear the charges. 14
As the grand jury investigation proceeded, the local community support
shifted toward the surgeon.15 In New Orleans, she became "something of a
folk hero" for staying behind to help critically ill patients. 16 While other
doctors had fled the oncoming storm, the surgeon had provided care for
four days in a "sweltering" hospital that had lost electricity and sometimes
reached 110 degrees until all the surviving patients were evacuated. 17
Thirty-four patients died during the ordeal. 18 Though prosecutors accused
the surgeon of administering lethal doses of painkillers and sedatives, the
Orleans Parish grand jury refused to issue indictments and instead returned
a "no true bill" decision. 19
Viewed from the outside, this New Orleans grand jury appeared to have
done exactly what the founders intended. It prevented an official exercising
central statewide authority (the state attorney general) from using his power
to charge a local citizen with a serious crime. Who better to make the
decision to prosecute actions under such circumstances than other citizens
from the same community who faced the same unusual hardships? It is this
ability, rarely seen in modem grand juries, that ought to be restored.
When the grand jury is viewed in this context, it is clear that most of the
existing reform proposals do nothing to restore the grand jury to its original
role. In sum, this role is to serve as the representative of the views of the
local community in criminal justice. To restore the grand jury to its original
role, reformers must make a subtle but important shift in focus. Reform
proposals ought to be focused not so much on making the grand jury more
independent of the prosecutor, but on making the grand jury less
independent of the people in the local community. Such a shift would not
only align the grand jury more closely with its original constitutional
purpose, and better serve all communities, but it might also have a
particularly good effect in minority communities. It might help to restore
the legitimacy of the criminal justice system in such communities by
improving their democratic involvement in these important issues.
Though minority communities and the founding era's Anti-Federalists
may seem like strange bedfellows in the post-civil rights era, they actually
may have something in common: a mistrust of federal (prosecutorial)
13. The attorney general also identified two other medical workers, nurses, who were
later offered immunity in exchange for their grand jury testimony. Nossiter, supra note 12.
14. Id.
15. Id. (noting that hundreds of people had attended a rally in support of the doctor).
16. Id.
17. Filosa & Pope, supra note 12.
18. Id.
19. Id. Afterward, the district attorney expressed agreement with the grand jury's
decision; the attorney general, whose office had also been involved in presenting the case,
criticized the grand jury's decision. Nossiter, supra note 12.
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power and a belief that such power can be an instrument of abuse of local
citizens.
Ironically, the grand jury may have lost its ability to serve in its
constitutionally envisioned role as community representative and protector
of local communities precisely because of the manner in which federal
courts have sought to insure diversity on juries. Under the current regime,
diversity in the grand jury is sought by assembling a grand jury from a pool
that represents "a fair cross-section of the community" within the entire
jurisdiction.20 While this general principle may reflect good intentions,
courts have interpreted it to presume that any given jurisdiction comprises a
single "community." In reality, each jurisdiction comprises numerous
communities that can be defined along many different lines.
In adopting the artificial notion that each jurisdiction is a single
community and then attempting to assemble jury pools that mirror the
diversity of the entire jurisdiction, courts dilute the representation of each of
the communities and suffocate the grand jury's ability to represent any
distinct community well. As a result, the jury pool, and ultimately the
grand jury, may constitute a fair cross-section of a jurisdiction, but most
certainly does not represent a fair cross-section of any one community. Put
differently, courts have interpreted the "cross-sectional ideal" in a manner
that suffocates the "community ideal."
The unfortunate practical effects of such a regime are myriad. The
districtwide grand jury that has the responsibility to review narcotics cases
from the urban inner city or the violent crime case from the distant Native
American reservation may have no residents from either of those
communities serving as a juror. Yet, in a society that remains highly
segregated, it may be far more important that each community is
represented accurately and fairly in important local institutions of criminal
justice, than that each community have token membership in a
jurisdictionwide institution.
This Article argues for restoration of the grand jury's original role as an
institution of local sovereignty that gives citizens of each community an
opportunity to participate meaningfully in the criminal justice system. In
accordance with the original purpose of the grand jury, the grand jury's
essential task must be to express the will of the community about the
prosecution of the law and, at least in some cases, to determine the
legitimacy of applying a national law in the local community in a particular
set of circumstances.
Part I of this Article places the grand jury both in historical context,
explaining the conventional narrative as to how it earned a hallowed place
in the Bill of Rights, and in contemporary perspective, explaining what this
narrative might mean about the proper role of the grand jury today. It also
explains the grand jury's role vis-i.-vis the trial jury and explains why the
grand jury may be far more useful than the trial jury in addressing the most
20. See infra text accompanying note 65.
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pressing contemporary challenges in criminal justice. Part II surveys and
evaluates the views of some of the leading critics of the grand jury and
reviews their proposed reforms. Part III more closely examines the
conventional criticism that the modem grand jury fails to serve as an
adequate check on prosecutorial power and explains why this criticism is
misplaced. It also discusses some of the other common analytical errors in
recent works critical of grand juries. Part IV explains the grand jury's more
appropriate role as a barometer of legitimacy of criminal justice in each
community and offers a theory as to why application of the Sixth
Amendment's "fair cross-section" rule has produced such pernicious results
in the grand jury context. Finally, Part V offers a proposal for a new
"neighborhood grand jury" model, which could restore the grand jury to its
historic role and help criminal justice achieve greater democratic legitimacy
at the local level.
I. ESTABLISHING THE GRAND JURY: THE GRAND JURY IN CONTEXT
A. Why Juries?
A citizen jury is a peculiar institution for making decisions. Why would
a government choose to use a body of citizens, rather than a learned judge
or a panel of experts, for making a criminal justice decision? Reasons
abound. One obvious purpose is to imbue criminal justice with a
democratic element. 21 Judge Learned Hand called the grand jury "the voice
of the community, '22 and it has also been likened to "the pulse of the
community."23  Use of a jury gives "the community," through ordinary
citizens, an important role in the provision of criminal justice.24
This democratic role serves numerous valuable purposes. 25  First,
opportunities for citizen participation further the legitimacy of the entire
21. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 487 n.33 (1984) (citing Stephen Gillers, Deciding
Who Dies, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 63-65 (1980) (noting "the importance of a representative
jury as an aid in assuring 'meaningful community participation')).
22. In re Kittle, 180 F. 946, 947 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910).
23. Alfredo Garcia, The Fifth Amendment: A Comprehensive and Historical Approach,
29 U. Tol. L. Rev. 209, 231 (1998).
24. Simmons, supra note 6, at 74-75 (noting that "the grand jury provides the criminal
justice system with a critical input of real-life experience, allowing the enforcement and
application of criminal laws to undergo a regular review by ordinary citizens"). The grand
jury is the first means of community input in the criminal justice system and is often the only
such input in light of the fact that most indictments result in pleas rather than trials. Id. at 46.
25. These purposes are no less important just because they are vague. Speaking of the
grand jury's cousin, the trial jury, Justice Antonin Scalia recently hailed it as "the spinal
column of American democracy." Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Scalia seems to use the metaphor as simply
meaning that the jury trial right was important or central. He fails to elaborate further on the
metaphor except to explain that the jury's power is designed to counterbalance the power of
judges. See id. at 32 (noting that "the Constitution does not trust judges to make
determinations of criminal guilt").
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criminal justice system. 26 The theory is that having members of the
community involved in the process assures their investment in the process
and confidence in the outcome. 27
The citizens' familiarity with the system in turn breeds trust.28 Alexis de
Tocqueville asserted that each citizen who serves on the jury feels invested
in society and feels that he has a share in the government. 29 Tocqueville
also suggested that juries are useful in educating the citizenry; citizens who
serve on a jury gain a better understanding of an important governmental
process. 30 Others have suggested that in addition to civic education, jury
service works a moral transformation on the common citizen. 3 1 It creates a
civic responsibility that "reinforces a vision of popularly-controlled
political participation." 32 Use of a jury may also improve the quality of the
outcome, for it has often been suggested that the numerous lay people on a
jury, with varying talents and perspectives, collectively have a comparative
advantage over a single judge in a range of areas, from reviewing facts and
understanding human nature, to understanding the moral legitimacy of the
law and expressing community morality. 33 A jury may even have a better
sense of justice than a judge does.34
26. "Ultimately, citizen representatives in the jury system have input" into governance
which "contributes to internal legitimacy" of the government and the criminal justice system.
Ethan J. Leib & David L. Ponet, Citizen Representation and the American Jury 29 (n.d.)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also Simmons, supra note 6, at 70 (noting
that the grand jury provides a sense of "procedural justice" that "enhances the legitimacy of
the criminal justice system").
27. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 7-9 (1966) (arguing that the
jury diffuses suspicion that might center on a judge and even "makes tolerable the
stringency" of certain unpopular decisions).
28. Ordinary anonymous citizens serving in part-time, episodic roles are more
trustworthy because they offer less opportunity for corruption than identifiable full-time,
long-serving government officials, such as judges. Jeffrey Abramson, We, The Jury: The
Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy 32 (1994) ("A network of local juries rotating
anonymous persons through its ranks was far more bribery-proof than standing panels of
known judges .... ).
29. 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 337 (Henry Reeve trans., Schocken
Books 1961) (1835).
30. Id. ("I look upon [the jury] as one of the most efficacious means for the education of
the people which society can employ.").
31. Abramson, supra note 28, at 32-33 (citing claims made by the Anti-Federalists at
the time of the nation's founding). Indeed, there is some empirical evidence suggesting that
ordinary citizens serve competently in jury service. See Leib & Ponet, supra note 26, at 17
n.20 (citing studies).
32. Leib & Ponet, supra note 26, at 26.
33. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating
that "jurors possess an important comparative advantage over judges [in being] more attuned
to 'the community's moral sensibility"' (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 481
(1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))); see also Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 314 (1989) (holding that "the purpose of the jury is to guard against arbitrary
abuses of power by interposing the commonsense judgment of the community between the
State and the defendant"); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (holding that "[tihe
purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power-to make available the
commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken
20081 2341
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In sum, the democratic and populist elements of the jury may be critical
in maintaining trust in the criminal justice system among the citizens.35
However, history suggests that the grand jury has an even more specific
purpose.
B. The Grand Jury in American Narrative
According to common accounts, grand juries became a part of the
American legal system primarily because they played important political
roles in key events in British and American history leading up to the
drafting of the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 36
In England in 1681, King Charles II sought an indictment for treason
against Anthony Ashley Cooper, the First Earl of Shaftesbury, and one of
his followers, Stephen Colledge, for speaking out against the King.37 The
Earl, a Protestant Whig, was a political opponent of the King who viewed
his criticism as treasonous. The prosecution was, in turn, seen as a
vindictive political act.
Grand juries in London, a predominately Protestant Whig city, twice
refused to issue indictments, despite strong pressure from Crown
authorities. After resisting the King's demands, the two grand juries were
widely lauded for their courage. 38 Crown authorities later presented the
case to a grand jury in Oxford, which was more sympathetic to the King,
and an indictment soon issued. The stubbornness of the London grand
juries, however, helped establish the reputation of grand juries as
prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased
response of a judge").
34. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (noting the jury's role as a safeguard
against a compliant, biased, or eccentric judge and contrasting the jury's "common-sense
judgment" with the "more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic" judgment of a judge); see
also Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 27, at 106-07, 285 (characterizing the jury's function as a
guarantor of lenity and equity in dispensing justice).
35. According to attorney George Harris, the "communitarian" functions of the jury
work as "1) a vehicle for direct community participation in the criminal justice system; 2) a
means by which the community is educated regarding the criminal justice system; and 3) a
ritual by which the faith of the community in the administration of criminal justice is
maintained." George C. Harris, The Communitarian Function of the Criminal Jury Trial and
the Rights of the Accused, 74 Neb. L. Rev. 804, 807-08 (1995).
36. Most scholars credit the inclusion of the grand jury right in the Bill of Rights to
certain events documented here. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief
History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 867, 869-76 (1994);
Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: Its History, Its Secrecy,
and Its Process, 24 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 6-12 (1996); Leipold, supra note 3, at 283-86;
Susan M. Schiappa, Preserving the Autonomy and Function of the Grand Jury: United
States v. Williams, 43 Cath. U. L. Rev. 311,328-31 (1993); Simmons, supra note 6, at 13.
37. Leipold, supra note 3, at 281-82; see also In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564, 568 (C.D.
Cal. 1971) ("These two cases are celebrated as establishing the grand jury as a bulwark
against the oppression and despotism of the Crown."); George J. Edwards, The Grand Jury:
An Essay 30 (Lawbook Exchange 2004) (1906) (noting the Crown's failure "to coerce grand
juries to its oppressive purpose").
38. Leipold, supra note 3, at 281-82.
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independent of the government. 39 As a result, the perception of the grand
jury as a bulwark of citizens' liberty reportedly was widespread in England
at the end of the seventeenth century, a time when British colonists were
flooding into North America. 40
Meanwhile, in the colonies, the first American grand jury convened in
Massachusetts in 1635, and grand juries spread to other colonies soon
thereafter. 41 The early colonial grand juries worked independently and
proactively, at least in part because local government was relatively limited
with few or no police resources to investigate accusations. 42
A notable and widely followed case showcasing the protective power of
the grand jury was the prosecution of John Peter Zenger in New York in
1734. Zenger, a newspaper publisher, angered the royal governor of New
York by publishing an editorial critical of the Crown. The governor, an
appointee of the Crown, reacted by seeking to prosecute Zenger for
seditious libel, a crime that prohibited criticism of public officials in a
manner that would threaten public tranquility by bringing the government
into disrepute.43
Consistent with prevailing practice, the Crown presented its case to a
grand jury in New York and sought an indictment. When the grand jury
declined to issue the indictment, the Crown presented the case to a second
grand jury, which also refused to indict. The Crown then bypassed the
grand jury altogether and prosecuted Zenger on the basis of a charging
instrument called an "information," which, unlike an indictment, was not
the product of a grand jury. Following a jury trial, Zenger was acquitted of
the offense. 44
According to the historical accounts, the Crown's extraordinary efforts to
bypass the grand jury in the Zenger case stoked widespread resentment in
the colonies. The resulting acquittal by the trial jury resonated widely in
39. However, subsequent to the two juries' failure to indict, the King moved Stephen
Colledge's case to Oxford, where potential jurors had views more sympathetic to the King.
Following a short trial which included Colledge's defense notes being turned over to the
prosecution, Colledge was convicted and executed on August 31, 1681. See Helene E.
Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 701,
715-16 (1972). Anthony Ashley Cooper, the First Earl of Shaftesbury, then fled the country,
fearing a probable indictment from a second grand jury in his case. Thus, instead, of being
symbolic of the grand juries' independence, Schwartz suggested that the Colledge and
Shaftesbury cases are actually indicative of the grand juries' vulnerability to politics. Id. at
719.
40. Leipold, supra note 3, at 283.
41. Id.; Kadish, supra note 36, at 9-10.
42. See, e.g., Leipold, supra note 3, at 283 (noting that most colonial governments had
little or no police force and it was grand juries that originated accusations).
43. See Amar, supra note 10, at 84-85; Leipold, supra note 3, at 284-85; Eben Moglan,
Considering Zenger: Partisan Politics and the Legal Profession in Provincial New York, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 1495, 1507 (1994).
44. See Leipold, supra note 3, at 284.
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the colonies, leaving a strong impression on colonial America of the
importance of the role of juries in criminal justice. 45
Emboldened by the outcomes of the Zenger proceedings, pre-
Revolutionary American juries and grand juries "all but nullified the law of
seditious libel in the colonies." 46 As a result, the Zenger case helped to
burnish the reputation of the grand jury. Together with the trial jury, the
grand jury came to be viewed as a valuable shield against government
oppression.
During the years preceding the Revolutionary War, public prosecutors
appointed by the Crown sought to enforce unpopular British revenue laws
in the colonies. In 1765, a grand jury in Boston refused to indict colonists
who had incited riots against the notorious Stamp Act.47 And, in case after
case, grand juries rejected the requests of public prosecutors and repeatedly
refused to enforce what the grand juries saw as unjust and oppressive laws.
The stubbornness of colonial grand juries had serious implications for
British policies. Many British laws, such as the Stamp Act and other
unpopular revenue measures, were rendered unenforceable in the
colonies. 48
The grand jury's reputation in the colonies as a shield against unjust laws
was thus established by the time of the American Revolution. Inclusion of
the grand jury in the Fifth Amendment seems to be based largely on
widespread popular respect for the grand jury at the time of the founding.49
The important role played by grand juries in the pre-Revolution era led,
apparently with very little debate, 50 to the adoption of the grand jury in the
Bill of Rights.51 The Fifth Amendment specifically provided that no person
could be prosecuted for a felony without a grand jury indictment. 52
45. See James Alexander, A Brief Narrative of the Case and Trial of John Peter Zenger,
Printer of the New York Weekly Journal (Stanley Nider Katz ed., 2d ed. 1972) (1963);
Amar, supra note 10, at 84-85; Nancy Jean King, The American Criminal Jury, 62 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 41, 42 (1999); Simmons, supra note 6, at 7-13.
46. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 36, at 874.
47. Richard D. Younger, The People's Panel: The Grand Jury in the United States,
1634-1941, at 28 (1963) ("In 1765, Boston [grand] jurors refused to indict the leaders of the
Stamp Act riots, while in Williamsburg, Virginia, jurors assembled for the general court
joined the mob that hanged the stamp master in effigy."); see also Roger Roots, If It's Not a
Runaway, It's Not a Real Grand Jury, 33 Creighton L. Rev. 821, 832 (2000).
48. K. Brent Tomer, Ring Around the Grand Jury: Informing Grand Jurors of the
Capital Consequences of Aggravating Facts, 17 Cap. Def. J. 61, 66 (2004) ("[Crown
officials] quickly realized the futility of submitting unpopular indictments to Massachusetts
grand juries.").
49. Younger, supra note 47, at 44-46 (discussing state ratifying conventions in which
grand juries were discussed).
50. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The Jurisdictional Heritage of the Grand Jury Clause, 91
Minn. L. Rev. 398, 412 (2006). But see Younger, supra note 47, at 45 (noting specific state
ratifying conventions that debated "the necessity of an express guarantee of the right to
indictment by a grand jury in all criminal cases").
51. Leipold, supra note 3, at 285.
52. The Fifth Amendment guarantees the right to an indictment: "No person shall be
held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
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Grand juries were also adopted by many states, in one form or another,53
though in one of the early cases of the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporation debate, the Supreme Court pointedly declined to hold that
grand juries are essential to due process in state prosecutions. 54
C. The Meaning of the Conventional Rhetoric and the Historical Narrative
The historical narrative set forth above is recounted widely by scholars55
and it represents the conventional wisdom as to the historical justification
for the American grand jury.56 If this narrative is accurate, it has several
implications, particularly at a time when the Supreme Court is employing
originalism in constitutional interpretation. While a defense of originalism
is beyond the scope of this Article, it is clear as a descriptive matter that the
Supreme Court has used originalist methodology in a number of recent
cases involving criminal procedure. 57 In Crawford v. Washington, for
example, the Court unabashedly-and unanimously-turned to the
"historical background of the [Confrontation] Clause to understand its
meaning. '' 58 Likewise, leading scholars across the political spectrum have
embraced originalism in some form or another. 59 A common tool of
originalist interpretation is to identify the evil that the provision was
intended, at the time of the founding, to address. By identifying such an
evil, one can determine the "core, specific original purpose" of the
provision.60 With respect to the grand jury, originalist methodology is not
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger .... U.S. Const. amend. V.
This guarantee is incorporated into Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
sets forth the method for constituting a grand jury and applicable rules, such as the rule of
secrecy. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2). A criminal defendant may waive the right to an
indictment and allow the United States to proceed on the basis of a complaint or another
charging instrument called an "information." Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(b).
53. See John F. Decker, Legislating New Federalism: The Call for Grand Jury Reform
in the States, 58 Okla. L. Rev. 341, 345-47 (2005).
54. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532-34 (1884). Akhil Reed Amar offers a
compelling argument that Hurtado is wrong. In the context of a broader argument about
incorporation generally, he argues that "due process of law" is a phrase that may have meant,
essentially, "by grand jury indictment," which was roughly the construction the English
phrase had been given in British law. Amar, supra note 10, at 200-01. Hurtado was a 5-4
opinion and Amar's opinion is strongly reflective of Justice John Marshall Harlan's dissent
in the case.
55. See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 3, at 68-76; Leipold, supra note 3 at 284-87;
Simmons, supra note 6, at 4-16. Moreover, in the absence of any competing narrative, there
is no reason to doubt the truth of this descriptive account.
56. See Niki Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the Constitutional
Function of the Federal Grand Jury, 94 Geo. L.J. 1265, 1302 (2006) ("Grand jury history is
incomplete without a ritual tribute to the grand jury's heroism in the famous prosecution of
Peter Zenger .... ").
57. See generally Jed Rubenfeld, The Paradigm-Case Method, 115 Yale L.J. 1977,
1981-83 (2006).
58. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-43, 69 (2004).
59. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, America's Constitution: A Biography (2005); Jed
Rubenfeld, Revolution by Judiciary: The Structure of American Constitutional Law (2005).
60. Rubenfeld, supra note 57, at 1982.
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new. Judge Hand once famously remarked, "We took the [grand jury] as
we found it in our English inheritance, and he best serves the Constitution
who most faithfully follows its historical significance .. *" 61
If one were inclined to use the originalist methodology to identify the
constitutional purpose of the grand jury, one could draw several
observations from the standard historical narrative of the grand jury. First,
one evil that the grand jury sought to address was the exercise of distant
governmental power in the local community. Indeed, the grand jury came
to us as an institution that was respected for its profound ability to protect
local communities-indeed, possibly rebellious ones-from central
governmental authority. It was, in essence, a local check on Crown
authority. The obvious implication is that the grand jury was primarily
deemed to be a check on "higher" governmental authority, such as kings or
national (or perhaps state) legislatures. In this respect, the Grand Jury
Clause might be viewed, like many other provisions in the Bill of Rights, as
an Anti-Federalist check on federal power.
Second, in the paradigmatic cases commonly discussed in the historical
narrative, the grand jury's primary method for exercising its power was not
a rigorous review of facts, but a stubborn refusal to enforce general laws. In
other words, the grand jurors do not seem to have disagreed so much with
the prosecutor's presentations of the facts, but with the legislator's right to
impose such laws, or at least the prosecutor's decision to enforce them in a
given context. So, for example, the grand jurors in the Zenger case did not
necessarily believe that Zenger was innocent of seditious libel; similarly, in
the tax protestor cases, the grand jurors did not believe that the protesters
were being wrongly accused of protesting their taxes. Rather, the
conventional narrative suggests that the grand juries simply disagreed with
the substance of these laws. These grand juries felt, for example, that
speech critical of the government, so-called "seditious libel," ought not be
illegal.62 Likewise, taxes and duties that were imposed in the absence of
proper democratic representation in Parliament were invalid (hence, the
popular refrain, familiar today to school children and citizens of the District
of Columbia, "no taxation without representation").
In sum, the grand jury may have one important responsibility that
suggests that its role is to review the sufficiency of the evidence for
indictments. But the historical narrative also suggests some other roles and
responsibilities: considering the legitimacy of laws, and/or considering the
legitimacy of the application of those laws in a particular case. In these
respects, the grand jury presumably was meant to serve a far different
purpose than the trial jury has come to serve.
61. In re Kittle, 180 F. 946, 947 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910).
62. Cf U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of
speech....").
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D. Grand Juries Versus Trial Juries in Contemporary Policy
As racial problems have plagued criminal justice in the United States and
filled deep reservoirs of mistrust in some communities, juries have served
as a focal point for seeking to address issues of fairness and insuring the
legitimacy of the system. In a long line of jury venire cases beginning with
Strauder v. West Virginia,6 3 the Supreme Court has sought to insure that all
voting citizens, not just white males, could serve on juries, or at least on the
venires from which juries are selected. 64 This line of cases culminated in a
constitutional principle, found within the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial, that a jury must be drawn from a venire that represents a fair cross-
section of the community. 65 In another line of cases that developed in the
past twenty-five years, including Batson v. Kentucky, 66 Powers v. Ohio,
67
and Georgia v. McCollum,68 the Supreme Court has sought to insure that
members of the jury venire cannot be stricken from the jury, through the
use of peremptory challenges, on account of their race.
Most of the attention, however, has focused on trial juries. While fair
racial composition of the trial jury is minimally required to restore the
legitimacy of criminal justice on racial issues, it is anachronistic to focus
solely on the trial jury today.6 9 Two modem circumstances undermine the
ability of trial juries to address issues of race in criminal justice: the
dramatic increase in plea bargaining and the prohibition of jury nullification
by trial juries.
1. Plea Bargaining, Citizen Participation, and the Grand Jury
Scholars have long encouraged greater citizen participation in criminal
justice on the theory that it will increase the law's legitimacy and serve
63. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
64. See generally Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime and the Law (1997) (surveying and
criticizing the cases).
65. For the federal system, this principle has been codified in the Jury Selection and
Service Act of 1968. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2000).
66. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Batson held that a prosecutor's peremptory challenges to all
four potential African American jurors violated the defendant's equal protection rights
because it "deprives the defendant of the protection against the arbitrary exercise of judicial
or prosecutorial power, undermines public confidence in the judicial system, stimulates and
perpetuates racial prejudices, and ignores the fact that a potential juror's race has no relation
to that juror's fitness for jury service." Mark W. Smith, Ramseur v. Beyer: The Third
Circuit Upholds Race-Based Treatment of Prospective Grand Jurors, 27 Ga. L. Rev. 621,
633 (1993).
67. 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that the criminal defendant does not have to be a
member of the same racial group as the juror on whose behalf he raises equal protection
claims).
68. 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (holding that a criminal defendant's racially discriminatory
exercise of peremptory challenges may also be unconstitutional).
69. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside of the Shadow of Trial, 117
Harv. L. Rev. 2464, 2467-68 (2004) (arguing that it makes no sense to design rules of
criminal procedure around trials when plea bargains are the norm).
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other important democratic values. 70 But, the prevalence of plea bargaining
has drastically reduced the number of trials 7' and robbed citizens of
opportunities for direct participation in criminal justice.72 Plea bargaining
inhibits transparency, insuring that criminal justice is run behind closed
doors by insiders (judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and law
enforcement officials) to the exclusion of outsiders (ordinary citizens and
victims) who are left ill informed about criminal justice.73 As a result,
some of the most basic purposes of juries are lost: criminal law is deprived
of the legitimacy that is served when ordinary citizens are directly involved
in its implementation, and the valuable jury process of debating, enforcing,
and preserving societal norms rarely happens.74
Some scholars are skeptical that there is any way to improve citizen
participation. 75  Professor Steve Bibas has offered partial solutions,
suggesting that prosecutors "publicize accurate statistics" about the criminal
justice system 76 and invite "citizen advocates" to "serve for two weeks at a
time... within prosecutors' offices, consulting on proposed felony charges
and dispositions." 77 These efforts would give "citizens a voice in criminal
justice procedures" and thereby "increase the system's legitimacy and
respect in their eyes." 78 Likewise, Professor Angela Davis proposes the
creation of "public information departments" within prosecutors' offices
that would enhance public knowledge of the prosecutorial function 79 and a
"prosecution review board," with a review function driven by affirmative
complaints and random reviews of cases. 80
While these proposals might help at the margins in addressing the decline
of citizen participation in criminal justice,81 these scholars have overlooked
70. See, e.g., David Fontana, Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act: Democracy
Index Rulemaking, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 81, 103 (2005); Kuckes, supra note 56, at 1317;
Jason Mazzone, The Justice and the Jury, 72 Brook. L. Rev. 35, 54 (2006); Simmons, supra
note 6, at 16; Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 513, 582
(2006).
71. See Bibas, supra note 69, at 2466; see also King, supra note 45, at 41, 59 (noting
that only three to ten percent of felony cases go to trial).
72. Bibas, supra note 69, at 2467-68.
73. See generally Bibas, Transparency, supra note 4.
74. Id. at 947-49 (arguing that citizen alienation from criminal justice clouds the law's
substantive message and effectiveness and impairs legitimacy and trust); see also Dan M.
Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Va. L. Rev. 349, 362-63
(1997) (discussing the expressive impact of criminal laws).
75. Bibas, Transparency, supra note 4, at 952 ("A note of pessimism is in order.").
76. Id. at 955.
77. Id. at 959-60.
78. Id.
79. Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of
Tyranny, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 393, 462 (2001).
80. The board would have the power to shed light on prosecutorial practices and
recommend disciplinary actions of prosecutors. Id. at 463.
81. Not even Stephanos Bibas himself has much enthusiasm for his modest reform
suggestions. See Bibas, Transparency, supra note 4, at 958 ("One cannot be certain, but
transparency might [improve thoughtful democratic influence over criminal justice]."); id. at
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a far more useful institution that is hiding in plain sight. While plea
bargaining has rendered the trial jury all but irrelevant as a nexus for citizen
participation, one need look only to the grand jury for an institution that can
fill this citizen review role very effectively. In the federal system and in
some state systems still, grand juries review nearly every felony offense.
Unlike the new institutions proposed by Professors Bibas and Davis, which
seem weak and easily marginalized, the grand jury is an existing institution
with constitutional status in which citizens already serve. Moreover, rather
than playing a mere advisory, informational, or post hoc review role, the
grand jury already exercises real institutional power. The citizens on a
grand jury theoretically have great independence and work in a large
team.82 If a significant goal is improving citizen participation, why ignore
the grand jury?
2. Trial Jury Nullification and Grand Jury Discretion
The prevailing legal principle-that nullification by a trial jury is
illegitimate-means that a juror who abides by her oath may be required to
ignore issues of racial justice that lie beneath the surface of a criminal
prosecution. Theoretically, at least, the trial jury has the responsibility to
adhere to a legal standard and to follow that legal standard as described by
the court in jury instructions. 83 Jurors often take an oath in which they
pledge to do just that.84 As a practical matter, the oath restricts the juror's
lawful authority to use her vote on guilt or acquittal to express her views on
racial justice. Thus, though a trial jury has the theoretical power to refuse to
convict a guilty person, it has no legally recognized right to do so. 85
Therefore, trial jury nullification is widely considered an unlawful abuse of
power and an especially pernicious one because it can erode the rule of
law. 86
The question of nullification led to an intense debate in the late 1990s
between two leading African American criminal law scholars over the
propriety of nullification by trial jurors. Professor Paul Butler famously
argued that black trial jurors should nullify the law in prosecutions of
blacks for nonviolent narcotics offenses, both to protest prosecutions of
960 ("The prognosis for major improvements in public information and participation, in
short, is not great.").
82. See id. at 960 (noting the difficulty in his theory of diffusing Tocquevillian educative
benefits to more than a small fraction of the populace).
83. Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 65 (1895) (noting that at trial it is the duty of the
judge, not the jury, to determine the law).
84. Simmons, supra note 6, at 46-48 (noting that while "the grand jury exercises its own
political, moral, and social judgment," trial jurors must convict if they find each of the
elements beyond a reasonable doubt or otherwise would violate their sworn duties).
85. See King, supra note 45, at 50-53 (describing the debate as to whether trial jury
nullification is a de facto power or a right).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(upholding the denial of a jury instruction on the "right of jury nullification" because, though
it sometimes happens, its explicit sanction would risk "the ultimate logic of anarchy").
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black offenders and also to deny the criminal justice system the legitimacy
it seeks by seating black jurors. 87 Professor Randall Kennedy strongly
objected to this approach, arguing that nullification subverts the rule of law
and, ultimately, the entire legal system. 88
Despite its intensity, the Butler-Kennedy debate related entirely to the
trial jury, an institution that can be only marginally useful in addressing the
underlying problem in any circumstances. In light of the rise of plea
bargaining and the sharp decline in jury trials, Butler and Kennedy might as
well have been arguing about the proper placement of the proverbial deck
chairs on the Titanic.89
Unlike the trial jury, the grand jury reviews nearly every felony case, at
least in the federal system and in those states that use the grand jury in such
a manner. And in contrast to nullification by the trial jury, which is of
disputed legality and at best highly controversial,9" the grand jury has
always been thought to have the power to decline to indict a guilty suspect.
Such an action is entirely lawful and, based on its rich historical heritage,
apparently entirely legitimate.
The Supreme Court has recently-and expressly-sanctioned the right of
a grand jury to deny an indictment even where the evidence meets the legal
standard of probable cause.91 This understanding is also reflected in the
oaths taken by grand jurors and the instructions grand jurors are given at the
outset of their work, which imbue them with more discretion than their trial
counterparts. Indeed, grand juror oaths commonly instruct jurors to indict
"no person through malice, hatred or ill will" and require them to affirm
that they will not leave unindicted any person "through fear, favor or
affection, or for any reward, or the promise or hope thereof .... -92 By
creating these very modest restrictions on grand jury discretion, this
language clearly seems to affirm the existence of a broad discretion.
Some commentators have labeled the grand jury's power to decline to
indict a guilty suspect "grand jury nullification." 93 Others have rejected
87. See generally Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the
Criminal Justice System, 105 Yale L.J. 677 (1995).
88. See generally Kennedy, supra note 64, at 301-10.
89. The jury nullification threat might also increase slightly the bargaining power of the
defendant in plea bargaining negotiations.
90. See Miller & Wright, 2005 ed., supra note 4, at 482.
91. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) ("'The grand jury is not bound to
indict in every case where a conviction can be obtained."' (quoting United States v.
Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 629 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., dissenting))).
92. See, e.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 324 (West 2003); see also Idaho R. Crim. P.
6.1(c)(3); Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges 7.08 (4th ed. 2000) (Oath to Grand
Jurors). In contrast, the oath for federal trial jurors requires the juror to swear or affirm to
render "a true verdict according to the law and the evidence." Id.
93. Leipold, supra note 3, at 307-10 ("Reasonable minds can disagree about whether the
grand jury's nullification power is desirable, but it seems clear that this function best
describes and explains the grand jury's screening role. More importantly, these are the terms
on which grand jury reform should be debated: whether the power to nullify is consistent
with the constitutional command, and whether it is a desirable part of a rational criminal
[Vol. 762350
RESTORING THE GRAND JURY
such rhetoric because it is misleading.94 Use of the nullification rhetoric
invites reference to the jury nullification debate and implies that grand jury
discretion is illegitimate. Since the grand jury has the lawful authority to
decline to indict, the grand juror's power is more akin to the power known
as "prosecutorial discretion" than jury nullification. Thus, perhaps the
grand jury's power to decline to indict should more appropriately be called
"grand jury discretion." In any event, the grand jury's right to refuse to
indict a guilty suspect contrasts sharply with the responsibilities of the trial
jury. Given that the grand jury has discretion to deny the application of law
in a particular case, why ignore the grand jury?
In sum, although developments in the area of plea bargaining and
nullification have marginalized the regular citizen in criminal justice by
minimizing opportunities to participate on trial juries and restricting the
choices available, the answer to these developments is not simply to declare
defeat or to construct weak ameliorative measures. Instead, those who are
interested in retaining citizen involvement in criminal justice-and
addressing problems of racial justice through citizen participation-should
shift their focus from the trial jury to the grand jury. Indeed, because the
grand jury is the gatekeeper to the criminal justice system and because the
grand jury clearly has the power to reject application of a racially suspect
law, the grand jury may offer a much better opportunity than the trial jury to
effectuate local norms of racial justice.
It is curious that scholars have virtually ignored the grand jury, especially
in the context of the jury nullification debate. One reason may be that few
scholars have much respect for the modem grand jury and few seem to pay
much attention to the obvious implications of the traditional historical
narrative.
II. SCHOLARLY CRITICISM OF THE MODERN GRAND JURY
AND LEADING PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Scholars examining the grand jury tend to adopt the historical narrative
recounted above as evidence of the grand jury's important historical role in
preventing oppression by the government. And by "the government"
scholars generally mean prosecutors. 95 The courts have hummed a similar
tune, extolling the importance of the grand jury as a check on the
justice system."); see also Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1421, 1429 (2004)
(also using the term).
94. Simmons, supra note 6, at 48 ("[G]rand jurors that dismiss a case when the
prosecutor has presented sufficient evidence and proven reasonable cause are neither
violating their duty nor breaking the law. The term 'grand jury nullification' is thus a
misnomer because it equates the grand juror's proper exercise of discretionary judgment
with a trial juror's improper decision to acquit those whom have been proven guilty."); see
also Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 359, 396
n.206 (2005) (agreeing with Simmons).
95. See generally Davis, supra note 79 (discussing historical examples of prosecutorial
abuses of power); Kuckes, supra note 56, at 1271-75 (describing the unique dual
responsibility of the grand jury to act as both prosecutor and judge).
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prosecutor. 96 The attention to the prosecutor, however, may have blinded
scholars to the more obvious meaning of the historical narrative. Consider
the conventional criticism of the grand jury and the proposals for reform.
A. Conventional Criticism of the Grand Jury
Despite the widespread belief that the grand jury's role is to serve as a
check on the prosecutor, the grand jury is widely criticized for failing to live
up to this role. The criticism is reflected in a clich6 common among
academics and practitioners that a skillful prosecutor could convince a
grand jury to indict "a ham sandwich. '9 7 The idea animating the clich6,
that the grand jury has utterly lost any independence from prosecutors,
resonates widely and has come to reflect the conventional wisdom.98
Indeed, the only phrase that appears in the literature almost as often as "ham
sandwich" is "rubber stamp." 9 9 In a very real sense, the grand jury has
become the laughingstock of American criminal procedure.
96. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 190 (5th Cir. 1965) (Wisdom, J., concurring)
(stating that grand juries "prevent[] harassment and intimidation and oppression through
unjust prosecution").
97. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 3, at 365 (noting that "most legislators, as well as
many practitioners and commentators, believe that the grand jury has lost its ability to act as
a 'shield' by screening out unmeritorious charges").
99. The "rubber stamp" metaphor apparently originated even earlier than the "ham
sandwich" metaphor, and may have first appeared in the report of the Wickersham
Commission, a blue-ribbon presidential commission appointed by President Herbert Hoover
to study the criminal justice system. See generally Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the
Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 Yale L.J. 1149, 1170-71 (1960)
(discussing the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement and its
conclusion that the grand jury had come to be seen as "an inefficient 'rubber stamp' for the
prosecutor"). However, the phrase has appeared regularly. See Fields v. Soloff, 920 F.2d
1114, 1118 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Because the states are not required to utilize a grand jury before
proceeding with a criminal prosecution, many, perceiving the institution as a mere rubber
stamp for government charges, have eliminated it entirely."). Some circuits have openly
stated their disapproval of grand juries acting as rubber stamps for the prosecutor. See United
States v. Flomenhoft, 714 F.2d 708, 712 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that the grand jury may not
become "a rubber stamp endorsing the wishes of a prosecutor as a result of the needless
presentation of hearsay testimony in grand jury proceedings" (citing United States v. Gallo,
394 F. Supp. 310, 314 (D. Conn. 1975))); United States v. Al Mudarris, 695 F.2d 1182, 1188
(9th Cir. 1983) ("The government is on notice that this court will not brook behavior that
degrades the grand jury into a rubber stamp, and the testing of the prosecutor's evidence into
an empty ritual."); United States v. Trass, 644 F.2d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 1981) ("As an
independent body the grand jury deserves respect. It should not be used as a rubber
stamp."). For criticisms of grand juries as rubber stamps for prosecutors, see Bibas, Judicial
Fact-Finding, supra note 4, at 1171 ("But today, grand juries are rubber stamps."); Brenner,
supra note 3, at 67 ("Despite its auspicious origins, the federal grand jury has become little
more than a rubber stamp, indiscriminately authorizing prosecutorial decisions."); Ian F.
Haney L6pez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial
Discrimination, 109 Yale L.J. 1717, 1747 (2000) ("In criminal matters, grand juries often
serve, at best, as little more than a rubber stamp for the prosecutor and, at worst, as an
accomplice in the abuse of power.").
The "ham sandwich" phrase is frequently attributed to former New York Chief Judge Sol
Wachtler. See, e.g., United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1195 (9th Cir. 2005)
("This skepticism was best summarized by the Chief Judge of this state in 1985 when he
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Moreover, a gap has developed between courts and the academy as to the
utility of the existing grand jury.100 While judges continue to use image-
laden rhetoric about the importance of the grand jury as a shield against the
prosecutor,101 legal scholarship is replete with scornful language castigating
the grand jury10 2 and arguing for reform. Professor Andrew Leipold
concludes, for example, that grand jurors, who are not law trained and have
little experience weighing evidence, are simply incompetent to second-
guess a prosecutor's decision to charge. 10 3  Likewise, Professor Niki
Kuckes concludes that "the grand jury is not an independent institution in
any meaningful sense" because it "consists of a series of panels of citizens"
who serve in a part-time role and who "virtually never hear from any voice
of legal authority other than the prosecutor.' 1 4 Professor Angela Davis
notes that the prosecutor "handles the calling and questioning of witnesses"
and "essentially control[s] the process."' 0 5  Other scholars have made
similar claims.' 0 6 In sum, most everything said about the grand jury in
modem academic literature reflects a particular understanding of the grand
jury and its relation to the prosecutor, which nearly all scholars view as a
subservient relationship.
publicly stated that a Grand Jury would indict a 'ham sandwich."' (citing In re Grand Jury
Subpoena of Stewart, 545 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977 n. I (Sup. Ct. 1989))); Fletcher v. Graham, 192
S.W.3d 350, 369 n.3 (Ky. 2006) (noting that "the 'indict a ham sandwich' reference is
attributable to former New York Chief Judge Sol Wachtler"). For use of the term by
academics see supra note 4.
100. Leipold, supra note 3, at 269-72 (noting the gap).
101. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972) (discussing the grand
jury's role in "protecting citizens from unfounded criminal prosecutions"); see also Wood v.
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962) (characterizing the grand jury "as a primary security to
the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution").
102. Professor Kuckes has noted the gap and has been highly critical of the courts for
fraudulently endorsing the notion that grand juries are independent. See Kuckes, supra note
4, at 47. She accuses the judiciary of marketing an expedient fiction of grand jury
independence that helps courts to appear consistent with historical traditions while actually
increasing prosecutorial power. See id. at 56; see also Brenner, supra note 3, at 67 (arguing
that "grand juries' continued presence invidiously maintains the illusion of a community
voice"). Professor Kuckes details the ways courts use the "fiction of grand jury
independence," but she is somewhat unclear on the motives. See generally Kuckes, supra
note 4. She seems to assume that judges are complicit in the growth of prosecutorial power,
but that growth in power has also treaded on judicial power. See generally id. The point that
she does not adequately address is, why is it desirable for the court to use the fiction to
achieve these results? My reading of Professor Kuckes's excellent research leads me to
believe that the fiction may be more of a "comforting fiction" than an expedient one. That
is, the behavior of courts may reflect naive optimism, rather than malignancy.
103. Leipold, supra note 3, at 294-95.
104. Kuckes, supra note 4, at 29-30.
105. Davis, supra note 79, at 423.
106. See, e.g., Bibas, Transparency, supra note 4, at 911, 930; Brenner, supra note 3, at




B. Existing Grand Jury Reform Proposals
Consistent with the widespread criticism, several commentators have
suggested that the grand jury is an irreparable anachronism,107 an artifact
that has outlived its usefulness and that should be abolished. 10 8 Other
scholars have viewed the grand jury just as a doctor sees the appendix: a
useless organ, but one that is unavoidable because it is part of us. Many
scholars have urged reforms that would reinvigorate the grand jury. 109
These are briefly surveyed below.
1. Proposals to Improve the Grand Jury Through Staffing and Expertise
Some scholars have suggested strengthening the institutional status of the
grand jury by improving its staff'10 or its expertise,"' or both.112
Professors Akhil Reed Amar and Ovio Lewis, for example, suggest that the
grand jury should have its own administrative staff, and Lewis would
include independent investigators. 13
Other scholars have focused on legal counsel. Professor Kuckes has
argued that the grand jury needs legal counsel outside the prosecutor's
office and suggests that the court could serve this role. 114 Likewise,
Professor Susan Brenner argues that the grand jury should be given its own
independent lawyer who would serve in that role for the duration of the
107. See, e.g., William J. Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 174, 178 (1973) ("[T]he grand jury has ceased to function as an agency
independent of prosecutorial influence."); Cassidy, supra note 3, at 365 ("[T]here is a
widespread view that this erosion of the grand jury's ability to act as a check on
prosecutorial power is beyond repair."); Leipold, supra note 3, at 323 ("In almost all cases, a
criminal defendant would be just as well off without the grand jury as he is with it."); Sklansky
& Yeazell, supra note 3, at 690 ("Today, the grand jury's role makes little sense .... ").
108. Brenner, supra note 3, at 123 (noting that one solution is to abolish the grand jury
through constitutional amendment); see also Frankel & Naftalis, supra note 6, at 118 (citing
the "powerful body of opinion that favors abolition of the grand jury"). The general debate
has been occurring for a very long time. See Edwards, supra note 37, at 35 ("That the
institution and its workings are open to criticism no one will question, but that the defects
which are pointed out by [the grand jury's] critics are of such a nature as to justify its
abolition cannot be so readily conceded.").
109. See Simmons, supra note 6, at 22; see also Cassidy, supra note 3, at 393-94
(suggesting that prosecutors be required to meet an ethical obligation not to distort the
evidence or mislead the grand jury, which would indirectly require presentation of
exculpatory evidence in many cases); Kuckes, supra note 4, at 65 (stating that grand jury
witnesses should be allowed to bring counsel into the grand jury room when they are
testifying and allowed to have transcripts of their testimony).
110. Amar, supra note 7, at 1185 (proposing that the grand jury be given staff).
111. Kuckes, supra note 4, at 31, 65 (suggesting that grand juries be given "an
independent legal adviser, selected from outside of the prosecutor's office").
112. Brenner, supra note 3, at 124-28; Lewis, supra note 7, at 64-66 (noting that the
grand jury needs additional resources such as independent legal counsel, investigators, and
clerical staff).
113. Lewis, supra note 7, at 64.
114. Kuckes, supra note 4, at 31, 65.
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term of the grand jury.'" 5 These proposals create an approach to grand jury
reform that might collectively be called the "well-staffed grand jury."
Professor Leipold, who argues that the average grand jury simply is not
competent to perform the complex tasks for which it is responsible, 116 takes
a slightly different tack. He proposes that the grand jury be composed of
lawyers, rather than laypersons."17 His proposal might be characterized as
the "elite grand jury."
2. "Information Empowerment" Proposals
Instead of focusing on grand jury staffing or qualifications, several
scholars focus on improving the quantity of the information before the
grand jury. To some of these scholars, the grand jury has an informational
deficit vis-d-vis the prosecutor, and the key to grand jury independence is to
improve the quantity of the information on which they base their decision
making. Professor Ric Simmons, for example, proposes to eliminate
resubmissions, that is, the prosecutor's ability to present a case more than
once. He argues that this would have the effect of encouraging the
prosecutor to prepare and present the case fully and thoroughly the first
time. 118 In addition to limiting resubmissions, Simmons favors adoption of
a rule giving a suspect the right to testify before the grand jury. 119
Similarly, several commentators have proposed requiring the grand jury to
be given access to any potentially exculpatory evidence available to
prosecutors. 120
Other scholars have suggested that the quality of the information before
the grand jury must be improved. Most cases presented to the grand jury
are presented through hearsay testimony offered by a single law
enforcement agent. Some scholars find this process deficient and seek to
improve the quality of evidence-and perhaps limit the quantity of
evidence-before the grand jury by applying the rules of evidence. 121
115. Brenner, supra note 3, at 124-28.
116. Leipold, supra note 3, at 294-300.
117. Andrew Leipold is in good company. In the early nineteenth century, Jeremy
Bentham had criticized the grand jury as a "'miscellaneous company of men' untrained in
the law." Younger, supra note 47, at 56.
118. Simmons, supra note 6, at 19, 71.
119. Id. at 23, 71.
120. See Cassidy, supra note 3, at 366 (noting the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence);
Kuckes, supra note 4, at 31, 65 (suggesting that prosecutors be required to provide "some
quantum of exculpatory evidence to be presented"); Suzanne Roe Neely, Note, Preserving
Justice and Preventing Prejudice: Requiring Disclosure of Substantial Exculpatory
Evidence to the Grand Jury, 39 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 171, 171 (2002). The U.S. Supreme
Court rejected such a requirement in United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 53-54 (1992)
(holding that an indictment may not be dismissed solely on the basis that the government
failed to present substantial exculpatory evidence to the grand jury).
121. See, e.g., Arenella, supra note 3, at 562. Several states appear to have included
evidentiary rules as part of their grand jury proceedings. For example, Utah has limited the
admission of hearsay to instances in which it would be admissible in preliminary hearings.
Decker, supra note 53, at 395 n.455 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-10a-13(4)-(5) (2002)).
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Though applying the rules of evidence might seem to limit the information
before the grand jury, proponents argue that quite the contrary result would
be achieved by adapting the hearsay rule to the grand jury; it would force
the prosecution to call a range of witnesses to testify and thereby provide a
much richer and more textured presentation of the facts to the grand jury.
As a result, these proposals might be grouped together as "information
empowerment" approaches.
In a related vein, still others have argued more generally for the rules of
evidence to be applied, including application of the exclusionary rule for
illegally obtained evidence, in grand jury proceedings. 122 This proposal
might be called the "admissible evidence" reform.
Professor Peter Aranella provided the first comprehensive proposal to
heighten the regulation of evidence before the grand jury in an effort to
improve evidentiary reliability, and many of the other proposals seem like
derivatives of various parts of his broad proposal.' 23 His more thorough
approach also has an enforcement component; defendants would routinely
receive transcripts of the case presented to the grand jury to screen for
violations of the rules.124
While some of the arguments for reform are compelling, almost all of the
leading reform proposals draw on the ham sandwich theme, 125 and assert a
primary purpose of empowering the grand jury to become more
independent of the prosecutor, mostly by improving the technical expertise
of the grand jury or the quality or quantity of the evidence it reviews.
However, as explained further below, there is no pressing need for a well-
staffed grand jury or an elite grand jury, or even any need to adopt any of
the "information empowerment" or "admissible evidence" approaches. On
the contrary, the grand jury must simply be restored to its original role and
the way to do that is largely oriented toward insuring that the grand jury is
properly constructed.
III. RECONSIDERING THE ROLE OF THE GRAND JURY
AS A CHECK ON PROSECUTORIAL POWER
What is most striking about the prevailing criticisms and the leading
reform proposals is that they seem entirely disconnected from the historical
narrative that is offered to justify the existence of the grand jury in the first
place. Consider the common reasons for seeking to change the way the
grand jury functions.
John Decker also points out that National Association of Defense Lawyers applauded New
York's application of evidentiary trial rules to grand jury proceedings. Id. at 395. For a
discussion of various state evidentiary rules imposed on state grand juries, see Brenner,
supra note 3, at 83-86.
122. See, e.g., Gerald B. Lefcourt, Curbing the Abuse of the Grand Jury, 81 Judicature
196, 197 (1998).
123. See Arenella, supra note 3, at 558-75.
124. Id. at 572-75.
125. See, e.g., id. at 474, 539 (using the "rubber stamp" metaphor).
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A. The Grand Jury as a Check on Runaway Prosecutorial Power
To many legal scholars, the American prosecutor has become public
enemy number one because of the aggregation of power within that office.
The grand jury is seen as the great hope for arresting this development.
Consider, for example, one leading criminal proceduralist's criticism of the
grand jury. Professor Davis asserts that "[t]he purpose of the grand jury is
to decide whether there is probable cause to believe the defendant
committed the alleged offense."' 126 The grand jury should "serve as [a]
protection for the accused and as a check on the prosecutor's charging
power... ."127 But today, she argues, "this goal is rarely fulfilled because
of the prosecutor's control over the process."' 128 This statement reflects
conventional wisdom and might have been made by any number of
scholars. 129
This singular focus on the prosecutor in leading scholarly works seems
somewhat inconsistent with the grand jury's general purpose as suggested
in the standard historical narrative of the grand jury. Professor Davis's
approach ignores the traditional American narrative of the grand jury in at
least two respects. First, the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century grand
juries were lionized not for their rigorous review of facts or even their
careful application of a legal standard to those facts. Rather, the praise
heaped on the Shaftesbury and Zenger grand juries, as well as those that
refused to apply the Stamp Act in the colonies, likely had little to do with
rigorous review of facts or application of law. Indeed, Zenger was almost
certainly guilty of seditious libel-he criticized the government no doubt in
an effort to bring scorn upon it.13 0 Likewise, presumably the tax-protecting
colonists did not seriously deny that they sought to disrupt the Stamp Act;
they simply disagreed about the law's legitimacy. If the Shaftesbury and
Zenger grand juries had viewed their roles in the same narrow way that
modem scholars like Professor Davis seem to view them, as mere reviewers
of probable cause, then these historical grand juries probably should have
issued indictments. Likewise, if these grand juries merely viewed their role
as carefully reviewing prosecution charging decisions for evenhandedness,
or nonarbitrariness, they may still have proceeded to indict.
But these grand juries had a different and, in some ways, more robust
view of their role. They disagreed with the laws that the prosecutor was
seeking to enforce and believed that they had the right to nullify these
126. Davis, supra note 79, at 423.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Another commentator, Michael Cassidy, has argued, for example, that the drafters of
the Fifth Amendment sought to prevent two types of prosecutorial abuse through the grand
jury. First, they sought to prevent a prosecutor from withholding evidence and, in effect,
substituting his own will for the judgment of the grand jury. Second, they sought to prevent
a prosecutor from pursuing an indictment not supported by probable cause in order to gain
leverage over an individual. Cassidy, supra note 3, at 376-77.
130. See Leipold, supra note 3, at 309 (noting that "from outward appearances [John
Peter Zenger] was guilty as charged").
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unfair laws. 13 1 Indeed, these early grand juries simply refused to apply
British laws that were unpopular locally. They effectively nullified general
or national laws that the local community deemed unjust.
This is the key lesson from the historical narrative. Despite widespread
dissatisfaction with the modem grand jury's lack of independence from the
prosecutor, it is their use of their own discretion to decline to indict for
policy reasons, not their rigorous scrutiny of facts, which earned these
grand juries praise and ultimately a hallowed place in the Bill of Rights.
It is worth noting again that the grand jury has never lost this power. The
Supreme Court continues today to recognize the right of the grand jury to
refuse to indict, even in cases in which the evidence is sufficient to establish
a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. 132 And unlike the trial jury, the
grand jury can nullify the law without stigma. The American grand juries
in the Zenger case and in the tax revenue cases were lionized for doing so.
The second, though less serious, problem reflected in these common
approaches to the grand jury is that the grand jury is expected to cure a
different problem than it was established to address. The historical
narrative suggests that the grand jury is not so much a substantive check on
the prosecutor's case against any specific individual, as a check on the laws
themselves. One might well describe this as a check not so much on the
prosecutor, but on the lawmaker.
Since the grand jury was admired for its ability to nullify the law, not for
its rigorous scrutiny of the prosecutor's evidence in a particular case, almost
all of the existing reform proposals seem ill conceived. Most of the existing
grand jury reform proposals are designed to improve the grand jury's ability
to scrutinize the prosecutor's factual evidence, improve the quality or
quantity of facts that are before the grand jury, or improve the expertise of
the citizens who serve on the grand jury. While these reforms might indeed
have the effect of making indictments more difficult to obtain by the
prosecutor, none seem in any way designed to bring back the aggressively
independent grand jury that was willing to nullify illegitimate laws.
Indeed, rigorous review of facts is the proper domain of the trial jury.
Despite the strong implication of the ham sandwich rhetoric, the grand
jury's screening or "shield" role is relatively new and it has never been very
substantive. The grand jury has almost always been primarily an aid to law
enforcement. 1 3 3
131. See Simmons, supra note 6, at 15-16, 23, 71 ("[T]he most celebrated cases for
which the grand jury gained its reputation.., had nothing to do with deciding whether the
amount of evidence presented met a given legal standard.").
132. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) ("[T]he grand jury is not bound to
indict in every case where a conviction can be obtained." (quoting United States v.
Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 629 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., dissenting))).
133. Roots, supra note 47, at 831 ("Crossing the Atlantic Ocean with the first English
colonists, the notion of the grand jury as an indispensable arm of law enforcement became
entrenched.").
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In early history, the grand jury did not have a prosecutor to guide it.
Cases were prosecuted privately.134 The modem approach, in which a
public prosecutor brings the accusation to the grand jury, actually reins in
the grand jury from its historical role. Early grand juries may not have
indicted ham sandwiches, but they may well have occasionally indicted
innocent citizens. Though many scholars are disappointed at the level of
scrutiny that grand jurors apply to the cases brought to them by prosecutors,
the grand jury's responsibility has been to evaluate the case presented by
the prosecutor for probable cause, which is hardly a rigorous standard.
Under this view, the respective roles of the grand jury and the trial jury
are quite distinct. The grand jury's role is to review the law and to conduct
only a nominal review of the facts. 135 While the probable cause standard
ideally insures that there will be no gross errors, it is not nearly as rigorous
as the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which the trial jury uses. It is
the trial jury that is supposed to accept the law as it is written and yet
engage in a very rigorous review of the facts. The beyond a reasonable
doubt standard at trial is designed to insure that an innocent person is not
convicted.136
The purpose of the grand jury, in contrast, is sometimes to insure that a
guilty person is not convicted, at least if the local community disagrees with
the content or application of the laws. 137 Indeed, this discretion is afforded
to grand juries but denied to trial juries. This unquestionably legitimate
discretion is one of the comparative advantages that the grand jury has over
the trial jury. 138 Indeed, to a grand jury acting within its discretion, the
facts are sometimes irrelevant. This may be part of the reason that one
detects a fair amount of ambivalence toward the grand jury by lawyers and
judges.
While the trial engages in a pristine legal process with fair procedures
and protections for the defendant, the grand jury reflects a more populist
134. See, e.g., Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: Criminal
Prosecution, the District Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 Crime & Delinq. 568,
570-75 (1984).
135. See, e.g., Leipold, supra note 3, at 289 (criticizing many of the procedural reform
proposals on the basis that the grand jury "need not, and indeed should not, replicate a
trial").
136. See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).
137. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 189-90 (5th Cir. 1965) (Wisdom, J., concurring)
("[T]he grand jury has the unchallengeable power to defend the innocent from government
oppression by unjust prosecution. And it has the equally unchallengeable power to shield
the guilty .... ).
138. Lest this point be overstated, note that some of the debates about jury nullification in
the trial jury context have begun to seep into the grand jury context. In United States v.
Marcucci, 299 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002), the defendants challenged the prosecutor's
failure to instruct the grand jury on its power of nullification. This issue echoes the long-
standing debate in the trial jury and may cause the issues to merge to some degree. See also
Gregory T. Fouts, Note, Reading the Jurors Their Rights: The Continuing Question of
Grand Jury Independence, 79 Ind. L.J. 323, 325 (2004) (criticizing the Marcucci court for
refusing to require the instruction of grand jurors about their nullification right).
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political influence, with fewer protections. As Judge Hand explained it, the
grand jury is
the voice of the community accusing its members, and the only protection
from [its] accusation is in the conscience of that tribunal.... [This
constitutes] an irresponsible utterance of the community at large,
answerable only to the general body of citizens, from [which the grand
jurors] come at random, and with whom they are again at once merged. 139
This is not a particularly ringing endorsement. Judge Hand clearly viewed
the grand jury, in some senses, as a populist and lawless mob.
To be effective in the traditional sense that earned it enshrinement in the
Fifth Amendment, however, the grand jury must be populist in nature. It
need not be concerned with facts; rather, it should scrutinize policy and
law.' 40 It is this role that should be restored.
While the leading reform proposals may "improve" the grand jury in
some senses, they do nothing to encourage the grand jury to exercise the
kind of independence that helped to establish the constitutional grand jury
in the first place. The grand jury attained its mythical status neither for
being a careful lawyer, nor a rigorous fact-checker, but for being a
rebellious law breaker that was willing to buck central authority.
In a very real sense, those scholars who seek to use the grand jury to rein
in prosecutorial power are simply aiming too low. They may well be
blinded by antipathy for the prosecutor and that institution's increasing
power in modern criminal law. 14 1 But it is not prosecutors who make the
laws that vest prosecutors with power; rather, it is legislatures. The grand
jury's ability to nullify a law is a negative power, not an affirmative one,
but it can make a powerful political statement about the legitimacy of a law
and can effectively render any law a dead letter.
If the historical basis for admiring the pre-Revolutionary grand jury was
its willingness to nullify the Crown's seditious libel and revenue laws, then
the discussion about grand jury independence should have a decidedly
different focus. The independence that should be encouraged is not so
much independence from prosecutors, but independence from legislatures.
In other words, the balance of power between the prosecutor and the grand
jury is not the real news. The real tension is between the local grand jury
and national or state lawmakers.
139. In re Kittle, 180 F. 946, 947 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910).
140. See generally Tomer, supra note 48 (suggesting that grand jurors ought to be told of
the capital ramifications of their actions, which reflects an appreciation for the distinctly
political role of grand juries).
141. Some of the scholarship seems to blame the grand jury for ever broader prosecutorial
power as though the grand jury was the source of the power. But it is, of course, the
legislature, not the grand jury, that gives the prosecutor power.
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B. Wrong Turns in Grand Jury Scholarship
It is remarkable how frequently scholars have parroted the standard
historical narrative set forth above and then offered procedural reforms that
seek to transform the grand jury into a far different institution than it was at
the time of the founding. 142 For the most part, scholars have ignored the
clear implications of the historical narrative, that is, that the shining purpose
of the grand jury is to decline to enforce a valid law, whether because of the
law itself or in the context of particular facts. 143 Many of them have done
so by characterizing the nature of the role of the grand jury incorrectly,
often leading them to misunderstand the purpose of the grand jury. Some
of these errors are discussed below.
1. Criminal Justice as a Contest Between the Prosecutor and Defendant
Many of the critics of prosecutorial power view the grand jury as an
essentially neutral participant and focus their reform efforts on how to
provide greater fairness between the defendant and the prosecutor (on the
explicit premise that the grand jury-and criminal justice authority in
general-has tilted too far toward the prosecutor).144 This approach reflects
a 1960s view of criminal justice, which pitted the prosecutor against the
defendant in a battle over basic procedural ground rules. This approach
reached its zenith, perhaps, in cases like Gideon v. Wainwright'45 and
Miranda v. Arizona.146  While it is natural, in an accusatorial and
adversarial system, to see the process of justice as a competitive event
between the prosecutor and the defendant and his counsel, this approach
dramatically oversimplifies the interests at stake and elides the considerable
nuance present in the process of criminal justice.
Indeed, our understanding of the criminal justice system, and its purpose,
has become much more complex in recent years. Modem criminal
procedure recognizes many legitimate institutional participants in the
criminal justice system beyond the prosecutor and the defendant. The
1980s and 1990s, for example, saw the rise of the role of the victim. The
victims' rights movement and aggressive advocacy on behalf of the victim
142. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 6, at 8-12 (discussing the Shaftesbury and Zenger
cases); id. at 70-72 (suggesting reforms such as abolishing representation of cases by
prosecutors and abolishing grand jury secrecy); see also Brenner, supra note 3, at 68-71, 70
n. 16 (citing the Zenger case); id. at 121-29 (suggesting reforms such as providing a grand
jury counsel for federal grand juries and empanelling a regional grand jury to investigate
government operations within its region).
143. Leipold, supra note 3, at 307-08 ("This explanation of the grand jury's role may
explain much of the folklore that surrounds the institution.").
144. See, e.g., Decker, supra note 53, at 343 (presenting "reform proposals that would
more appropriately balance the States' interests in investigating and bringing charges against
the perpetrators of those crimes versus the accused's interest in being treated with dignity
and respect").
145. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
146. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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has made the victim a very real participant in the criminal justice system.147
While the victim was always present in the background, some of the
modem developments move the victim from a place in the back of the
courtroom to a much more substantial institutional role in the disposition of
criminal cases. Indeed, the victim now has a legally protected role in
criminal trials and sentencing. 148 In many jurisdictions, the victim must be
consulted prior to disposition of cases outside trials. 149 At least one scholar
has even suggested that victims ought to be given a Gideon-like right to
counsel to represent them at trial. 150 While the newly invigorated role of
the victim is problematic in a variety of respects, and therefore
controversial,151 it cannot be ignored. Because the victim's interests are
often different than, and often in conflict with, the interests of the
prosecutor, 152 the presence of the victim undermines the existence of a
dualistic criminal justice universe that some scholars stubbornly continue to
observe.
The Supreme Court has also worked aggressively in recent decades to
increase (or perhaps restore) the status of the jury in the criminal justice
system. In Duncan v. Louisiana, for example, the Court underscored the
importance of "community participation in the determination of guilt or
innocence." 153  Likewise, in Williams v. Florida, the Court highlighted
"community participation" and the sense of "shared responsibility" that
results from group decision making. 154 These themes have grown even
stronger in the last decade. In a very recent series of cases, the Supreme
Court has reasserted the importance of the jury in finding facts relevant to
guilt and sentencing in criminal cases. 155 As a result of these cases, the jury
147. Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs at the Criminal Trial, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 863,
868 (1996) ("[N]o movement in criminal law has been more powerful in the past twenty
years than the 'victims' rights' movement, which has sought to enhance the place of the
victim in the criminal trial process.").
148. See generally Crime Victims Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) (Supp. V 2005)
(setting forth a list of enumerated rights).
149. The U.S. Attorneys' Manual provides, for example, that in federal cases victims
should be consulted regarding plea negotiations. U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorneys'
Manual § 9-16.030; see also Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 § 6, 18 U.S.C. §
1512 (2000).
150. See Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1353, 1398-1400 (2005)
(recommending that victims in rape cases be represented by counsel at government expense).
151. See generally Paul H. Robinson, Should the Victims' Rights Movement Have
Influence over Criminal Law Formulation and Adjudication?, 33 McGeorge L. Rev. 749
(2002) (explaining problems related to the role of victims in criminal adjudication and
suggesting that victims' roles should be limited to policy formulation).
152. See Lininger, supra note 150, at 1398-1400.
153. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968).
154. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
155. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 220 (2005) (applying the Blakely holding
to the federal sentencing guidelines); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305-08 (2004)
(striking down a sentencing guidelines regime that conflicted with Apprendi's holding); Ring
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires that the
jury, rather than the judge, determine the presence of aggravating factors in a capital
sentencing proceeding); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 525 (2000) (holding that,
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is a force that must be reckoned with much more often in sentencing. Since
much of the rhetoric about the jury suggests that the role of the citizen juror
is to represent the public at large, and the community in particular, the
increasing institutional role of juries at trial and in sentencing reflects the
increasing status of the public and the community in criminal justice. 156
As a result of both the victim and jury developments, there are additional
legitimate participants in the criminal justice system that represent interests
other than those represented by the prosecutor and the defendant. The
criminal case is no longer simply a battle between a prosecutor and a
defendant in a neutral forum. It is much more nuanced. It involves a range
of different institutional players, each with a different legitimate interest in
the criminal justice system. Thus, it is utterly simplistic to assess the value
of the grand jury solely as it relates to the balance of power between the
prosecutor and the defendant.
As reflected in the rhetoric of judges that call the grand jury the "voice of
the community," and in light of the conventional historical narrative about
the purpose of the American grand jury, the grand jury is a peculiar
institution with its own legitimate institutional purposes that should be
considered on its own merits.
2. Independence as a Contest Between the Prosecutor and Grand Jury
Other critics view the grand jury as a key institutional player, but
overemphasize the importance of the balance of power between the grand
jury and the prosecutor. 157 This approach also presents a false dichotomy
and likewise fails to account for critically important actors.1 58
The standard historical narrative suggests that the grand jury is an
institution of local sovereignty designed to protect members of local
communities from the local exercise of central (and perhaps distant)
authority. By serving a gate-keeping role for criminal prosecutions, the
grand jury holds (and occasionally presumably should exercise), on behalf
"[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
156. That jury trials are waivable means that the use of the jury is subject to the control of
the defendant. This is somewhat antithetical to the view that the community has an
independent right to be involved in criminal justice. However, it does reflect that the
community has a right to participate when there is controversy about guilt. One scholar has
made a compelling argument, based on historical practice and precedent, that the Court erred
when it held in United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002), that the right to a grand jury
indictment is waivable by the defendant. See generally Fairfax, supra note 50. If the Court
read the Fifth Amendment to require indictment by grand jury to establish the court's
jurisdiction in a criminal case, there would be a much clearer legal claim buttressing the
standing of the community in criminal cases.
157. See supra Parts II.A-B.
158. In an insightful article, Professor Kuckes breaks out of these characterizations and
focuses heavily on the grand jury's democratic purposes. See generally Kuckes, supra note




of the local cormnunity, a veto over national or state laws that the local
community deems illegitimate or that are not appropriate in a given case.
While most recent critics are interested in the conflict (or lack thereof)
between the grand jury and the prosecutor, this approach is too narrow.
Although today's prosecutor is very powerful, the prosecutor remains
merely an agent of the legislature, with the responsibility to enforce laws
not of the prosecutor's own making. In that sense, the grand jury really
stands between the accused and the entire apparatus of the central
government, not just between the accused and the prosecutor.
Likewise, the view of the grand jury merely as a protector of the accused
is far too narrow. The grand jury is an agent of the local community, with
the responsibility to provide local community input (and potentially a veto)
on the law that the prosecutor seeks to enforce as an agent of the legislature.
The grand jury not only has the interests of the defendant in mind, but also
the interests of the community. The protection that the grand jury offers the
defendant may be justified precisely because the defendant is a member of
the community. After all, protecting each individual member of the
community from overreaching by the government is the best way to protect
the entire community.
In some respects, the prosecutor and the grand jury are merely agents.
As the prosecutor is effectively an agent of the state or national legislature,
the grand jury can be seen as an agent of the community and its job is to
protect the community from unjust applications of the state or national
laws. If this is the proper light in which to view the grand jury, the question
is not how to make the grand jury more independent of the prosecutor, but
how to make the grand jury less independent of its own community. In
other words, if there is a problem with the grand jury, it may be in the
nature of an agency problem between the grand jury and the community it
is theoretically constructed to represent.
Ideally, the grand jury is not simply a protector of the defendant or a tool
of the prosecutor, but a representative of an equally important actor in the
criminal justice system: the community. In this respect, the grand jury is a
political actor that ought to be independent of "the government."
3. Grand Jury as Executive, Judicial, or Legislative Actor
The law is full of institutions that serve different roles to different
observers. A prosecutor, for example, might say that the purpose of the
trial jury is to measure trial evidence against a particular legal standard
composed of the elements of an offense, through the lens of a particular
burden of proof, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. A political
scientist, on the other hand, might say that the purpose of the jury is to
enhance the involvement of the community in criminal justice. A
constitutional law scholar might say that the jury serves as a check on both
executive and judicial power. These purposes are distinct, yet none are
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necessarily inconsistent with one another. It is for that reason that it is
misleading to limit the descriptive accounts of juries.
Another false dichotomy about the grand jury is set forth in an article by
Professor Kuckes which suggests that at times the Supreme Court has
treated the grand jury as a judicial actor and at other times as a
prosecutor. 159 Using this duality as an explanatory device for the muddled
nature of grand jury jurisprudence, she makes a seductive argument that the
path out of the confusion is to select only one of these roles for the grand
jury and to stay true to it.160 She then characterizes the grand jury as "a
democratic force within the prosecutorial function" and concludes that the
grand jury ought to be seen as a sort of "democratic prosecutor.' 6 1 If the
grand jury is a prosecutor, then it follows that a defendant ought to have
greater procedural rights before the grand jury. 162 Though this conclusion
might be convenient for one who wishes to enhance procedural rights for
defendants, it is not very compelling, for several reasons outlined below.
A real insight in Kuckes's work is the separation of powers approach that
she suggests as a mode of analysis. 163 In setting the question up as a
dilemma, a binary decision between prosecution and adjudication, however,
Kuckes has oversimplified the issue. Our system of government recognizes
at least three different roles with regard to the criminal laws. Indeed, in our
tripartite system of government, the question of the role for the grand jury
actually presents not a dilemma but a "trilemma."
As for the prosecution role, while the grand jury's job is to issue
indictments in appropriate cases, its refusal to apply a law that is viewed as
unjust is plainly not in the nature of an executive act. Indeed, it obstructs
executive action. To the prosecutor, the grand jury is not really a partner,
but an obligatory obstacle. The modem grand jury creates an opportunity to
stop a prosecution, but is not likely to initiate one on its own. At least since
the decline of presentment, one cannot say that the grand jury is really an
accuser. 164 Unlike the prosecutor, the grand jury is an organic, independent
body that does not report to any executive official. It is a somewhat passive
body and its purpose is not to execute the law or enforce it. It thus seems
unwise and inaccurate to characterize the grand jury's function as executive
in nature.
If the grand jury is not exercising an executive-prosecutive function, does
it follow that the grand jury is better characterized as exercising a judicial
role? Well, yes, perhaps, at least to the extent that it is ruling on probable
cause. But while the grand jury nominally adjudicates for probable cause, it
159. See generally Kuckes, supra note 56.
160. Id. at 1299-1309.
161. Id. at 1299.
162. Id. at 1313.
163. See generally id.
164. Renee B. Lettow, Note, Reviving Federal Grand Jury Presentments, 103 Yale L.J.




was not canonized for its ability to measure the facts against a legal
standard of probable cause. Indeed, when it acts in its heroic historical role,
the grand jury is not usually applying law at all, but defying it. This would
hardly seem to be a judicial action.
Under the three obvious options available for selection in an American
model of governance, the elimination of the executive and the judicial role
leaves one other obvious option: a legislative role. And this
characterization fits better than one might expect. While Professor Kuckes
characterizes the citizen participatory role of the grand jury as a "homeless
theme" that runs through the jurisprudence, 165 that theme is homeless only
if one creates a false dichotomy that creates no place for it. Such a false
choice ignores the compelling purpose reflected in the historical narrative
which suggests that the role of the grand jury was sometimes neither to
prosecute, nor to adjudicate, but to serve a policy- and law-making (or at
least law-blocking) role. In many respects, the grand jury is a quasi-
political body designed to exercise local popular sovereignty.
In the traditional narrative, the grand jury is useful precisely because it
makes important decisions about policy. In that respect it is neither
adjudicative, nor prosecutorial, but quasi-legislative in nature. Indeed, its
most vital role seems to have been to give the local community a voice, and
really a veto, over the enforcement of a general law within the local
community. 166
The obvious implication of the conventional historical narrative of the
grand jury is that it was enshrined in the Bill of Rights for its ability to
undermine unpopular laws or to block their application in the local
community (either generally or in particular circumstances). Its job, in
other words, seems to have been simply to serve as a local institution of
popular sovereignty, a local check on general laws.
Blocking a law is not necessarily a prosecutorial function nor an
adjudicative function, but a political and somewhat legislative one. 167
Indeed, in seeking to determine whether a government actor is behaving in
a legislative or an adjudicative capacity, we frequently look to factors such
as whether there is an individualized determination, based on "adjudicative
facts" or one based on general, sometimes called "legislative," facts. 168 In
165. Kuckes, supra note 56, at 1300. Even Professor Kuckes recognizes the grand jury's
"democratic" elements. Id.
166. One of the best reform proposals suggests that grand juries ought to be told of the
capital ramifications of their actions. See Tomer, supra note 48. Such a reform is
particularly insightful because it credits the distinct political role of the grand jury.
167. According to one Revolutionary-era source, the grand jury is "'a body of truth and
power inferior to none but the legislature itself."' Younger, supra note 47, at 41 (quoting 1
The Miscellaneous Essays and Occasional Writings of Francis Hopkinson, Esq. 229-35
(Phila., T. Dobson 1792)).
168. For the constitutional distinction as it arises in the context of ordinary administrative
law questions of due process, compare, for example, Londoner v. City and County of
Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908) (holding that an agency decision as to a tax on an
individual taxpayer requires a hearing), with Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of
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the paradigmatic Zenger case, the grand jury likely was not making an
individualized judgment about the facts related to Zenger's guilt, but was
operating at a policy level, expressing its view that seditious libel is not a
crime that should be prosecuted. 169 It was making its decision based on
legislative facts. Thus, one can argue that the grand jury is better viewed as
a political actor that exercises legislative power, though only negative and
not affirmative legislative power.
The grand jury's power is somewhat akin to the President's veto power,
though it is much narrower because the grand jury only works in specific
cases and has only limited geographic jurisdiction. Likening the grand jury
to the President might, at first blush, suggest that the grand jury is
exercising an executive rather than a legislative role. But the President's
veto power is not an executive power at all; it is a legislative power. 170
Thinking about the grand jury as a quasi-legislative actor also offers
terrific insight about its difference from the trial jury. The grand jury is a
quasi-political institution. The trial jury, on the other hand, is a strictly
legal institution; the trial jury does function like a judge and is required to
follow the law. In constitutional separation of powers parlance, the trial
jury, like the court that it is part of, ought to defer to the legislature as to the
policy choices made in enacting laws. The grand jury, on the other hand, is
not so bound. It has independent authority to reject the application of a
given law in a given case.
Another distinction sometimes suggested is that trial juries and trial
jurors are officers of the courts. 171 Grand juries, on the other hand, exercise
an authority that is independent of the courts and not subject to judicial
supervision.172 These existing legal rules support the view of the grand jury
as an institution that is neither strictly prosecutorial, nor strictly judicial, but
sometimes exercises political or quasi-legislative powers.
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (holding that an agency decision that applies to all
equally does not require a hearing).
169. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
170. Most of the President's powers are considered executive powers, but when the
President decides to exercise the veto, the President is participating in the legislative process.
Indeed, the President's veto power is described in Article I, Section 7. E.g., INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983); Vasan Kesavan & J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief, 44
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (2002).
171. United States v. Arredondo, 349 F.3d 310, 318-19 (6th Cir. 2003) ("Jurors and
veniremen are officers of the court. Their conduct is governed by a separate section of the
federal contempt statute, 18 U.S.C. § 401(2) (prohibiting 'misbehavior' by a court officer),
as well as the generally applicable contempt provision of 18 U.S.C. § 401(1)."). Consider
that prosecutors are also officers of the court, though the supervisory power of the court is
somewhat limited due to separation of powers concerns.
172. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992) (asserting that "the grand jury




C. The Deeper Ramifications of Grand Jury Discretion
To be fair, some critics may have downplayed the implications of the
historical narrative that portrays the grand jury as a political institution
because they are troubled that broad grand jury discretion is akin to
nullification by the trial jury. Consider Professor Leipold's objection:
The danger in giving the power to nullify to a group of unelected,
anonymous, and unaccountable citizens is that they are free to use that
power in illegitimate ways, precisely because they are unaccountable.
The power to nullify is, at least in the particular case, the power to
frustrate the presumptive will of the electorate to enforce the criminal law
when the evidence shows that a crime has occurred. Although
nullification is case specific, and may not even be permanent as to that
target, it can be a potent force for frustrating legitimate societal
objectives. 173
While this is a legitimate objection and one that causes serious
consternation in the trial jury nullification context, the obvious implications
of the historical narrative of the grand jury require us to grapple with such a
role. Indeed, if the historical narrative means anything, it may well mean
that "frustrat[ing] the presumptive will of the electorate" is an important job
of the grand jury. 174
One might well find it curious that the constitutional founders, who
created a new central government, would create a government institution
that was mythologized precisely because of its ability to frustrate central
government authority. The grand jury was perceived as a valiant and heroic
institution when it was used to obstruct the power of the distant Crown. But
when the founders retained the grand jury, they created an institution that
could obstruct laws enacted through a democratic process.
Presumably, laws that were made right here on American soil are less
offensive than laws made in England. Indeed, the Federalists argued
against the use of juries for just this reason. 17 5 We might expect grand
jurors to be less aggressive in blocking laws that were enacted on their
behalf by their own representatives. The need for such a political function
is simply less compelling in this context. However, the Anti-Federalists
feared central authority in general and it was for this reason that they
insisted on the Bill of Rights.
One could wonder whether such a countermajoritarian institution is
necessary in a democratic society. And one might also wonder about the
wisdom of the founders in creating such an institution. But they did create
it. Retention of the institution is clearly consistent with the mistrust of
central authority that is apparent throughout the Constitution and the Bill of
173. Leipold, supra note 3, at 309.
174. Id.
175. Abramson, supra note 28, at 33 (noting that Federalists accused those who wanted to
maintain the local jury of "fighting old battles" against the British Crown because, with
democratic representation of local views in the legislature, Federalists thought juries were no
longer necessary).
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Rights. This mistrust often extended to authority that was democratically
elected.
When the grand jury has played a political role, it has stood against laws
that are unpopular locally or against the application of laws in specific
circumstances. That is the proper nature of grand juries. They serve to
prioritize local policy preferences over national ones.
A context that might give one pause is the Civil War. Grand juries
played a critical political role in this country before and after the Civil War.
As Professor Leipold has noted, "Southern grand juries were quick to indict
those involved in crimes related to abolition, and Northern grand juries
were slow to indict those similarly accused."' 176 Following the Civil War,
Southerners used grand juries to prevent indictment of those who
committed crimes against freed blacks, allowing crimes to go unpunished
and successfully blocking a significant part of the Reconstruction
agenda. 177 Those who yearn for greater grand jury independence may have
doubts when informed of this behavioral pattern of Southern grand juries.
Indeed, the countermajoritarian nature of the grand jury can have troubling
consequences. 178
Nevertheless, the obvious implication is that the power of a local grand
jury to nullify the general laws enacted by the central government is
legitimate and indeed, is the reason that the grand jury requirement was
retained in the Constitution. Such power, while troubling in certain
instances, can provide the local community the sense of participation and
investment in criminal justice that is necessary to assure local confidence in
that system.
IV. THE GRAND JURY AS BAROMETER OF LEGITIMACY
AND A THEORY OF WHAT WENT WRONG
While conventional criticism of the grand jury in scholarship is ill
founded to the extent that most of it is entirely unmoored from the grand
jury's original purpose and overly focused on the role of the grand jury vis-
A-vis the prosecutor, criticism of the role of the grand jury in modem
criminal justice may nevertheless be appropriate. Whether one accepts the
conventional wisdom that the grand jury should act more independently of
the prosecutor, or the more nuanced view presented here-that the grand
jury's role is to represent the local community and thus act more
independently of all the instruments of central authority, including the state
or national legislature-a good deal of evidence suggests that the modem
grand jury tends not to act very independently in either sense. The grand
jury today rarely rebuffs a prosecutor on a request for an indictment and
176. Leipold, supra note 3, at 286.
177. Simmons, supra note 6, at 14, 19; see also Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 36, at 890-
92.
178. Presumably, however, these dire consequences occurred only because significant




thus rarely nullifies the law. According to much of the academic literature,
prosecutors achieve success rates above ninety-nine percent in obtaining
indictments from grand juries. 179
It is true that a high success rate for prosecutors seeking indictments is
not necessarily problematic. It could reflect positively on the cases that
prosecutors choose to bring to grand juries. Such statistics could reflect, for
example, simply that communities are generally pleased with the laws being
prosecuted and the local application of those laws. It could mean that the
laws are legitimate in virtually every application and that the grand jury
simply has not had an opportunity to use its powers to block prosecutions.
In short, the high success rates may be due to the fact that prosecutors are
highly skilled in reading, and adhering to, the grand juries' preferences. On
the other hand, the high indictment rate may reflect the failure of the grand
jury to exercise properly its constitutionally envisioned function of
protecting local communities from the unfair application of locally
unpopular laws enacted by a central authority. Under the current regime, it
is simply impossible to know which account is correct.
From another vantage point, however, it is easy to conclude that the
grand jury is not living up to its constitutionally envisioned role. For
decades, the American criminal justice system has suffered withering
criticism related to race and discrimination. This criticism strikes directly
at the legitimacy of the system. 180 The historical narrative suggests that the
best way to find out what the community thinks about the legitimacy of a
general law is to ask the local grand jury for an indictment to enforce it.
Return now to the debate in which the question of the community's
recognition of the legitimacy of criminal justice arose: the context of
powder versus crack cocaine sentencing disparities. Professor Kennedy
argued that African American members of Congress from predominantly
African American congressional districts pushed for harsh penalties for the
distribution of crack cocaine.181  On this basis, Professor Kennedy
suggested that black communities might well support such sentences; he
used this argument as a basis for undermining those who criticized the
crack/powder disparity. 182  Other scholars strongly disagreed.183
179. Fouts, supra note 138, at 329-30 ("In fiscal year 1984, for example, statistics show
that federal grand juries returned to prosecutors 17,419 indictments, compared to sixty-eight
no bills, a success rate of 99.6% in obtaining indictments." (citing Office of Mgmt. Info. Sys.
& Support Staff of the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, United States Attorneys'
Statistical Report: Fiscal Year 1984 (Report 1-21) at 2 (n.d.))). Gregory Fouts also notes
that in 2001, federal grand juries returned only twenty-one no bills. Id. at 330 (citing Fed.
Justice Statistics Res. Ctr., Federal Justice Statistics Database, http://fjsrc.urban.org (last
visited Mar. 23, 2008)).
180. Cf Nancy J. King, The Effects of Race-Conscious Jury Selection on Public
Confidence in the Fairness of Jury Proceedings: An Empirical Puzzle, 31 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 1177 (1994) (arguing that race conscious jury selection techniques should be allowed
despite equal protection concerns to the extent that they are used to address legitimacy issues
in criminal justice related to race).
181. Kennedy, supra note 64, at 370-72.
182. See id.
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Ultimately, the debate was inconclusive, however, because it is simply
impossible to determine how much support punitive narcotics laws have
had within the communities most ravaged with drugs and prosecutions.
The grand jury today may not be providing a definitive answer to
questions like these because it is not effectively representing the community
it has the responsibility to represent. What better way to find out what the
community thinks and give effect to that popular will than by asking the
community directly, through indictments sought from anonymous local
grand juries?
A. A Theory of What Went Wrong with the Grand Jury
If citizen participation in the grand jury is designed at least partially to
insure widespread confidence in criminal justice, then the legitimacy crisis
in criminal justice in some communities reflects that the grand jury is not
serving its constitutionally envisioned function.
Why is today's grand jury refusing to address important issues of
criminal justice policy? Theories abound. Professor Brenner, for example,
notes that as the laws have become more complex jurors have been forced
to rely much more on the prosecutor to understand them. 184 Professor
Leipold makes a similar, though slightly more nuanced point. He suggests
that grand jurors are not effective in screening cases because probable cause
is a vague and fluid standard best understood by people who have seen
numerous cases and have internalized the "pattern recognition" of probable
cause in actual cases. 185 These theories are not very compelling, however.
It is hard to believe, for example, that today's narcotics laws are any more
complex than the laws applied by colonial grand juries, such as seditious
libel or the Stamp Act. Likewise, probable cause is not difficult to
understand; it is simply a fairly low bar.186
In her incisive critique of prosecutors, Arbitrary Justice, Professor Davis
makes several compelling arguments as to why grand juries fail to serve as
an adequate check on prosecutors. First, the grand jury is institutionally
weak; it is composed of "ordinary citizens without legal training." 187
Second, while the grand jury can call additional witnesses, the grand jurors
"don't usually know enough about the case to know which witnesses to
183. See, e.g., David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall
Kennedy's "Politics of Distinction," 83 Geo. L.J. 2547, 2553 (1995); David Sklansky,
Cocaine, Race and Equal Protection, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1283, 1300-01 (1995).
184. Brenner, supra note 3, at 67 ("At worst, grand juries' continued presence invidiously
maintains the illusion of a community voice. This lulls corrective action and permits
increased prosecutorial abuse.").
185. Leipold, supra note 3, at 300-02.
186. See Angela J. Davis, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor 26





call."' 188 Third, "[g]rand jurors don't know the criminal statutes or how to
apply them, so they must rely on the prosecutor."' 189
Professor Davis strongly implies that American grand juries will indict
defendants even when the prosecutors are engaging in racist
prosecutions. 190 If that is so, the current grand jury is failing to serve its
proper role. The grand jury was included within the Bill of Rights to guard
against unfair laws and unfair applications of law. Thus, if such troubling
prosecutions are happening, it must mean that there is something gravely
wrong with the grand jury. What could it be?
This Article offers a theory. One obvious difference between the pre-
Revolutionary grand juries and grand juries today is the inclusiveness of the
juries and the diversity of the communities they represent. Early American
grand juries were far better at representing their communities than modem
grand juries. In those times, most of what counted as a relevant
"community" for purposes of government were narrowly defined to include
a limited group of people, white male property owners, who had much in
common. 19 1  Consistent with the then-prevailing construction of the
political community, colonial and early American juries were composed
entirely of members of this very narrow class. 192 These grand juries
represented communities that were homogeneous and exclusive. In facing a
common enemy abroad, these communities had political interests that were
very closely aligned. In the years since, the American citizenry has become
much more diverse. To some degree, juries have come to reflect this
diversity. 193
In other words, while the grand jury as a legal institution has changed
slightly in the past two centuries, the grand jurors-and the political
communities that they represent-have changed tremendously. In an
increasingly diverse world, the average grand jury simply may no longer be
composed of a community of people with common interests. 194 It may well
be that changes to the demographics of the grand jury, rather than the
changes to the legal institution, explain the decline in grand jury
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 25-30, 38.
191. Professor Adam Samaha has described these communities as "comparatively tiny,
crowded against the eastern seaboard, economically backward, isolated by crude
transportation and communication technology, tolerant of one human being owning others,
wedded to narrow gender roles, [and] religiously parochial." Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand
Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming Apr. 2008)
(manuscript at 16, on file with author). One can see why such communities might be far
more cohesive, at least in contrast to today's more diverse jurisdictions.
192. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 36, at 877-78.
193. Id. at 868.
194. Some have noted the striking inability of the trial juries to keep pace with the
increasing diversity of American society. See Nancy J. King & G. Thomas Munsterman,
Stratified Juror Selection: Cross-Section by Design, 79 Judicature 273, 273 (1996). In 1990
one of four Americans claimed nonwhite ethnicity, while in 1960, "90 percent of Americans
were white, and most of the remaining 10 percent were African American." Id.
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independence. As the grand jury becomes more diverse, it is much less
likely to represent a unified voice. A more diverse grand jury is likely to be
more divided. An institution that is divided, in turn, is weaker than one that
is unified. In some senses, this change has the clear effect of shifting power
from the grand jury to the prosecutor (and even the legislature).
To say that the United States has become much more diverse, however, is
not necessarily to say that communities have become more diverse.
Individual communities in the United States have tended to remain racially,
ethnically, and economically segregated and, within these segregated
bounds, often very homogeneous. Ironically, the law's efforts to embrace
diversity in criminal justice, and specifically in the context of the trial jury,
may have contributed to the weakening of the grand jury and its ability to
serve its proper purpose.
B. The Failure of the Cross-Sectional Ideal
In nearly a century and a half since the Civil War, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly addressed problems related to racial composition of juries.195 As
the United States grew and became more diverse, and as women and
members of minority groups earned the right to vote and serve on juries,
courts worked to address the changing demographic circumstances. The
legal principle that has emerged in this jurisprudence is that a defendant is
entitled to a jury selected from a broader jury venire that fairly represents
the entire community. The legal hook for this principle resides in the Sixth
Amendment. Its guarantee of an "impartial" jury in a criminal trial has
been interpreted to require that trial jurors be chosen from a venire that
represents a "fair cross-section" of the community. 196
In the context of a trial, the cross-sectional ideal can be very useful in
assuring a fair jury to the defendant and for members of the various
minority communities within the jurisdiction. At trial, most American
courts require a unanimous verdict to convict. 197 Thus, every vote counts.
A single stubborn member of the jury can theoretically withhold a vote in
favor of conviction, insuring that a minority community's voice has an
opportunity to be heard in the deliberation process.
While the "fair cross-section" principle seems sensible in the abstract, it
has not produced satisfactory results in achieving ideal jury composition in
practice for a variety of reasons. First, the rule has been enforced only in a
very broad fashion. 198  Appellate courts have recognized that it is
195. See generally Kennedy, supra note 64.
196. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
530 (1975). See generally Kennedy, supra note 64.
197. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930) (holding that unanimity is one
of the "essential elements" of a federal criminal jury trial); Fed. R. Crim. P. 31 (a) (requiring
a unanimous verdict).
198. See generally Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection and Jury
Selection: Denying That Race Still Matters, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 511 (criticizing the failure of
the jurisprudence to achieve real inclusion of members of minority groups on juries).
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improbable or impossible for a court to achieve a jury venire that
constitutes a perfect cross-section of the community. 199 Because of the
practical difficulties in obtaining a perfect cross-section, however, courts
have accepted wide deviations from the perfect cross-sectional ideal. In
some cases, these deviations have seemed to overcome the ideal. In many
cases, the courts have upheld jury venires that not just marginally but
substantially failed to capture the racial diversity in the jurisdiction. 200 In
the worst cases, the venires are grossly disproportionate to the racial
demographics of a given jurisdiction, yet the venire meets the very low
legal standard that the courts have defined.
Second, to some degree by necessity, the proportionality analysis is very
crude. In an increasingly heterogeneous society, even a venire that is
broadly representative in a macro or statistically significant sense may
produce a jury that has no members who are racially or ethnically similar to
the defendant. It may not contain a single member who speaks the same
language as the defendant, especially if the defendant is from a small
minority group. This dynamic may well grow more pronounced as the
broader society continues to become more diverse. As a result, in practice,
the fair cross-sectional ideal is more aspirational than actual.
This criticism is not new. In the vast legal literature on juries, numerous
commentators have noted problems in achieving racially diverse juries. 20 1
Among the suggested solutions are to use race conscious jury venire or
panel-selection techniques. 202 As our jurisprudence has grown ever more
hostile to race consciousness and affirmative action, however, such efforts
199. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 477-80 (1990). Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, opined that the Sixth Amendment guaranteed the defendant a jury drawn from a
fair cross-section of the community, but not a jury representative of the community's racial
and ethnic composition. Id.
200. In evaluating jury venires in a fair cross-section analysis, the courts tend to measure
the "absolute disparity" between the demographics of the jury venire and the demographics
of the jurisdiction by simply subtracting the former from the latter. So, for example, if
African Americans constitute ten percent of the population within the jurisdiction and make
up only one percent of the population on the jury venire, then the "absolute disparity" is nine
percent. Such a disparity might well be found constitutional. See, e.g., United States v.
Butler, 611 F.2d 1066, 1069-70 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding an absolute disparity of less than
ten percent to be constitutionally insignificant). As a result, juries are routinely found
constitutional even if they dramatically fail to mirror the population of the jurisdiction. Id.
201. See id.; see also Hiroshi Fukurai, Critical Evaluations of Hispanic Participation on
the Grand Jury: Key-Man Selection, Jurymandering, Language, and Representative Quotas,
5 Tex. Hisp. J.L. & Pol'y 7, 11-12 (2001). See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Racial
Quotas and the Jury, 44 Duke L.J. 704 (1995); Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering:
Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 707, 760-75 (1993) (summarizing various proposals for race conscious jury
selection and concluding that considerations of race should be permitted); Deborah A.
Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury De Medietate Linguae: A
History and a Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. Rev. 777, 809-16 (1994) (examining
problems inherent in connecting jury selection and race).
202. Alschuler, supra note 201, at 731-41 (outlining several possible methods and citing
the strengths and weaknesses of each); see also King, supra note 201, at 760-75
(summarizing approaches).
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are likely to fail.203 Moreover, as argued below, the cross-sectional ideal
may be failing to serve any useful purpose in the grand jury context.
C. The Perniciousness of the Cross-Sectional Ideal
in the Grand Jury Context
Since the cross-sectional ideal grew organically from the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of an impartial jury, it need not necessarily apply
to the grand jury requirement, which is secured in the Fifth Amendment and
grows from different traditions. Nevertheless, without any serious
consideration of the ramifications of the effects of such a decision, the
Supreme Court imported the fair cross-sectional ideal into the Fifth
Amendment grand jury requirement in federal cases and into the Fourteenth
Amendment conception of due process for state courts.
20 4
While in the trial jury context, the fair cross-section approach had
positive, though weak, effects in fighting invidious discrimination, it has
had less salutary effects in the grand jury context. One reason is that grand
juries lack the unanimity requirement; they simply function by majority
rule. While a lone holdout in a trial jury can prevent a conviction, 20 5 the
dynamic is significantly different in a grand jury. In a grand jury, a lone
dissenter, or even a plurality of dissenters, can be easily overcome by a
majority of grand jurors, leading to the issuance of an indictment. Thus, the
single juror from a distinct insular community has a lot less leverage to
force discussion in the grand jury of issues of racial or ethnic bias, or other
issues troubling to members of that community. As a result, the cross-
sectional ideal is less useful in helping minority communities address
problems in this context.
Second, when the fair cross-sectional ideal is applied to a statewide,
countywide, or districtwide community, each minority community's
minority status will be reflected in the grand jury. In that sense, the fair
203. King, supra note 201, at 734 (noting that race conscious jury selection policies are
suspect for a variety of reasons under modem cases). Professor Nancy King's predictions
seem to be bearing out. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127
S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007) (overturning a school integration plan that relied on racial
classifications in efforts to fill slots for an oversubscribed school, with Chief Justice John
Roberts famously saying that "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race"); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 246, 275 (2003)
(holding that a race conscious school admissions policy was not sufficiently narrowly
tailored to survive scrutiny).
204. See Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel & Nancy J. King, 4 Criminal Procedure §
15.4(d) (3d ed. 2000) (citing Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339 (1984)); see also Powers
v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause bars a
prosecutor from using peremptory challenges to exclude potential jury members solely on
the basis of race); United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 940 (9th Cir. 2005) ("The
selection of a grand or petit jury in violation of either the equal protection or the fair cross-
section guarantee is structural error that entitles a defendant to relief without a demonstration
of prejudice.").
205. Fed. R. Crim. P. 3 1(a) (requiring a unanimous jury verdict); see also Ethan J. Leib,
Supermajoritarianism and the American Criminal Jury, 33 Hastings Const. L.Q. 141, 142
(2006) (discussing the widespread adherence to the jury-unanimity rule in state courts).
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cross-sectional ideal seems designed to prevent any community from
having a grand jury that fully represents it. In this way, the fair cross-
section principle has transformed the grand jury from a countermajoritarian
institution to one that simply reinforces the power of the entrenched
majority.
Moreover, a more diverse grand jury is likely to be more divided. Such a
grand jury is less likely to serve its appropriate role. To express this notion
in a manner consistent with the frustrations of so many scholars, such a
grand jury is unlikely to serve as an effective check on the prosecutor.
While a grand jury may once have been seen as a countermajoritarian
force of local sovereignty against a state or national legislature, this is no
longer true. But as jurisdictions grow and become more diverse,
particularly in cities, the grand jury simply becomes a microcosm of the
legislature, at best. At worst, it preserves the majoritarian structure of the
legislature and the broader society and prevents minorities from succeeding
in exercising any influence in the evaluation of criminal laws.
Put another way, in seeking to create a grand jury that constituted "a fair
cross-section of the community," courts have emphasized the cross-
sectional ideal at the expense of the community ideal. It is likely that the
early grand jury was respected and deemed to be effective because it
expressed the will of the local community. It was able to express that will,
however, only because it was tightly connected to the community it
represented.
Indeed, a grand jury that is designed to represent everyone actually
represents no one. A grand jury that mirrors the legislature will fail to serve
as any sort of check on legislative power. As diversity has flourished in the
United States, the courts still operate under the fiction that each jurisdiction
is one "community."
In reality, of course, any construction of "community" is artificial. No
jurisdiction constitutes a single "community." Each jurisdiction is an
amalgamation of numerous communities, whether defined along
geographic, occupational, social, religious, or other lines. In adopting the
artificial notion that each jurisdiction is a single community and then acting
on this notion by assembling jury pools that attempt to mirror the diversity
of the entire jurisdiction, we dilute the representation of each of the
communities and suffocate the grand jury's ability to represent any
community effectively.
V. RESTORING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE GRAND JURY
To reframe questions about the grand jury's effectiveness, one approach
might be to treat the grand jury issue as a typical agency problem between
the grand jury, as a quasi-political actor, and the community it is supposed
to represent. The question is whether the agent's interests align with those
of the community, or, on the other hand, whether the interests should
somehow be realigned. Thus, one approach to reform might be focused on
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how to make the grand jury less independent of the community it has the
responsibility to represent and indeed more responsive to that community.
But how can the agent's interests be realigned to match those of the
community it is constructed to represent? If the grand jury is failing to
realize its potential in protecting local communities, how can we improve
the performance of grand juries to insure that they are more effective in
helping to preserve the legitimacy of criminal justice?
In the eras of Zenger and later the Stamp Act protests, the interests of the
community and its grand jury presumably were well aligned. In each
instance, the grand jury took actions that earned it praise from the local
community. Early American grand juries represented communities that
were smaller and much less diverse. Grand juries consisted of educated and
propertied white males and they no doubt represented similarly situated
citizens quite well. Women and nonwhites were nonentities, as a legal
matter; the grand jury was not expected to represent their interests. As
jurisdictions grew larger and more diverse, they came to be composed of
more and more communities. But instead of multiplying, grand juries
remained static, defined by very broad geographic terms, not narrow
community ones. As the world has become more diverse, the grand jury
has thus failed to remain relevant. 20 6
The way to restore the "independence" of the grand jury, and really the
essential purpose of the grand jury, is to recognize the grand jury's political
and representative nature and to restore the attributes that would allow it to
maintain relevance. The insight offered by Professors Albert Alschuler and
Andrew Deiss that the grand jury's "role in American civic life declined" as
its "composition became more democratic" 20 7 ought to be viewed as a
profound tragedy. The grand jury has an important role to play in a
governmental system that necessarily sacrifices local legitimacy when it
locates power in various central (and distant) governmental authorities.
One way to restore the legitimacy of criminal justice is to return the grand
jury to its role as a democratic institution of popular sovereignty.
To restore this role, we need not change the way the grand jury works;
we merely need to change the way that it is constructed. If the grand jury is
properly viewed as a quasi-political institution-an institution that emerged
not so much as a substantive, but as a political check on the legislature and
the prosecutor-it should be constructed in a manner that allows it to meet
its quasi-political purpose. And given this quasi-political role, a grand jury
must be constructed differently than a trial jury.
206. A second factor was, perhaps, the prestige of the grand jury. In those early days, the
"community" that the grand jury represented was an elite community composed of educated
white male property owners, and the grand juries were often created by asking leading or
"key" members of the community to select the members. See generally Sara Sun Beale et al.,
Grand Jury Law and Practice § 3:6 (2d ed. 2005). Although the "key man" system of
selecting jurors has not been struck down, it has been much more rigorously policed, and
grand juries now tend to be composed of ordinary citizens whose names are drawn from
public roles, not "key" ones drawn from the community elite. See id.
207. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 36, at 867-68.
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A. The "Neighborhood Grand Jury" or the "Grand Jury by Zip Code"
To make the grand jury more effective as a political institution, it is
necessary to minimize the gap between the grand jury and the community it
represents. Put another way, we need to solve the agency problem to align
the interests of the grand jury more closely with the interests of the
community it serves.
Though "propertied white males" was an artificial community that looks
too narrow in hindsight, the grand jury presumably represented that
constituency well. On the community's behalf, the grand jury refused to
apply laws enacted by a central government that were unpopular locally. 20 8
While no one would argue for a return to grand juries composed only of
propertied white males, one who yearns for the return of the "independent"
grand jury may well wish for a grand jury that better represents each
community and that is more tightly constructed. By giving community
members a much more meaningful role in criminal justice, such a grand
jury could help to restore the legitimacy of criminal justice in each
community.
In an increasingly diverse society, opportunities for citizen participation
ought to be enhanced, not minimized. With this in mind, one potential
solution is to increase the number of grand juries and to "localize" them. In
other words, the solution to the grand jury problem may not be to provide
different tools to the grand jury,209 or even to insure through affirmative
action that each grand jury has some number of minority members.210 The
solution may not be instrumental. Rather the solution is political. The
grand jury should be gerrymandered-not racially, but geographically.
Instead of a districtwide or countywide grand jury, each jurisdiction
should construct numerous "neighborhood grand juries" that represent
much smaller constituencies and that are thus likely to be more closely
aligned with the communities (or neighborhoods) that they represent.
Consider perhaps a "grand jury by zip code" approach. A grand jury in
each zip code would vastly expand the involvement of the local community
in criminal justice. Another way to achieve the same ideal, using existing
political boundaries, would be to choose small political districts, such as
House legislative districts or city council districts. 211 Professor Adriaan
Lanni has put forth a similar proposal in a much wider context, arguing that
208. Such grand juries were often, at least in some places, selected by election. Younger,
supra note 47, at 28-29.
209. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 6, at 21 (discussing the elimination of hearsay
evidence).
210. See, e.g., King, supra note 201, at 767 (recognizing the importance of fairness and
the use of race in the jury selection process).
211. For a not very different approach related to trial juries, see Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural
Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community Representation, 52 Vand. L.
Rev. 353 (1999). Forde-Mazrui argues for the selection of jurors from legislative districts
that have been further divided into "communities of interest." Id. at 386.
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"grand and petit juries" should be "drawn from a small catchment area
representing the local community. '212
As Professor Lanni has suggested, it is not at all clear what would be the
most efficacious means of selecting the definition of "community" for such
purposes.213 However, the notion here is that a grand jury that is more
localized could replicate the kind of community that existed when the Bill
of Rights came into being and could meet the constitutionally intended
purposes of the Grand Jury Clause more closely. Consider that the
population of Boston around the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights
numbered approximately 18,000 residents, 214 a substantial percentage of
whom were women and children and others who could not serve on a grand
jury.
In a society that is far more heavily populated and much more diverse,
we ask too much from a grand jury that is culled from an entire county or
judicial district. 215 The representation of each community in such a grand
jury is diluted to the point that the grand jury is effectively homogenized.
Such a grand jury simply cannot serve the same role as these earlier grand
juries, which represented a modest-sized community of similarly situated
people.
Consider a large, diverse city like Los Angeles. Perhaps there should be
150 or more grand juries scattered at various places across the city. Such a
decentralized model would give greater voice to subcommunities in Los
Angeles and insure that the diversity that exists on the streets is actually
represented in this governmental institution.
The most compelling cases for the use of localized grand juries arise for
those offenses that have a distinctly local impact, for example, cases where
both the victim and the defendant are members of the same community.
Most crimes against persons and many narcotics offenses meet these
criteria. Hearing such cases in the neighborhood grand jury can increase
the notion of self-determination at the local level. When an offense occurs
at the local level and primarily affects people within a single community, it
is more difficult to justify interference from a broad central authority. On
the other hand, crimes that involve outsiders present different problems.
There, the costs of using local grand juries may exceed the benefits.
212. Lanni, supra note 94, at 394-95. Lanni notes that "the history and tradition of the
jury as protector of the people against the unjust use of government power furthers the
community justice movement's goal of enhancing the legitimacy of the criminal system." Id.
at 395.
213. Id. at 395.
214. Jacqueline Barbara Carr, After the Siege: A Social History of Boston, 1775-1800, at
4 (2005); Lawrence W. Kennedy, Planning the City upon a Hill: Boston Since 1630, at 261
(1992).
215. The twenty-three citizens that serve on a grand jury cannot serve as a
countermajoritarian force of local populism against the application of national or statewide




While some may doubt the salience of the localized geographic
community in an increasingly atomized physical world in which many
people are far more connected to nongeographic communities defined by
professional connections or other communities developed through Internet
capabilities, geographic communities are still highly salient to many of the
most common crimes. Violent crime, for example, affects one's sense of
physical safety and has the most significant effects on people within the
zone of risk of such events.
B. The Advantages of Neighborhood Grand Juries for Local Offenses
The neighborhood grand jury or "grand jury by zip code" approach offers
numerous benefits consistent with all of the original virtues of the grand
jury. Consider the advantages of jury service cited by the Supreme Court
and commentators and how much more effectively they would be served by
such an approach.
1. Expanded and Improved Educative Benefits of Jury Service
Consider the Tocquevillian educative benefits of jury service. 216 A grand
jury in each community would insure that far more citizens would be able
to serve in a meaningful role in criminal justice. The educative value to the
citizenry of the increased volume of citizen participation would be
tremendous, but the substance of the education would be improved as well.
Because members of the grand jury would be educated about crime in their
own community, grand jury service might help motivate greater action in
addressing crime. As the world we inhabit has become much more
atomized, grand jury service would help to reconnect members of a
community around a specific problem that is highly important to that
community. 217
In a very real sense, a grand juror becomes educated about specific
crimes by virtue of reviewing indictments and hearing factual presentations
about each one. A grand juror may gain a sense of which crimes are
prevalent and where crime is most serious. But, while some form of
education occurs under the current regime, it may often contribute more to
misinformation than useful knowledge.
When a grand jury is drawn from a countywide venire, most of the
members will routinely see crimes committed in neighborhoods not their
own. Because members of grand juries tend to see only felonies, they see
216. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1991) ("'I do not know whether the
jury is useful to those who are in litigation; but I am certain it is highly beneficial to those
who decide the litigation; and I look upon it as one of the most efficacious means for the
education of the people which society can employ."' (quoting de Tocqueville, supra note 29,
at 337)).
217. For an idiosyncratic account of service on a federal grand jury in the Southern
District of New York, see Blanche Davis Blank, The Not So Grand Jury: The Story of the
Federal Grand Jury System (1993). Blank discusses the sharing of bags of candies and tins
of cookies and pizzas among jurors. Id. at 18.
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only the worst actors and the most tragic events. In their ordinary roles as
grand jurors, citizens rarely see any happy occurrences in those
communities. As a result, grand jurors necessarily develop a warped view
of those communities with the most crime, and this warping occurs no
doubt most profoundly when the community is not their own. Communities
would be far better served if members of the community became more
informed about the crime in their own communities. Those citizens would
be better situated-and better motivated-to work to address these
problems, even after jury service has ended.
2. Improved Community Representation and
Legitimacy in Criminal Justice
A grand jury constructed from a single zip code or neighborhood would
also be much more effective in providing the "voice" of the community, to
borrow Judge Hand's metaphor. 218 Of course, the voice of the community
may now have an accent or use a different language entirely, as the number
of languages spoken in the United States has increased dramatically. To
give the grand jury its intended purpose, however, each of those voices
must be heard.
Any jurisdiction has multiple community voices. Legitimacy will be
fully restored only when the criminal justice system can hear each of the
substantial voices present in the jurisdiction.219 Substantial criminal justice
scholarship suggests that legitimacy is better served when the community is
invested in fair criminal justice processes. 220 In turn, the rule of law is
served. Citizens are more likely to comply with the law and cooperate with
police in investigations. 221
If the most serious legitimacy problems stem from a lack of trust in the
government in certain quarters, the most effective way to address such
mistrust, again to borrow from Tocqueville, is to give citizens from those
communities a "share in government." 222 If inclusion builds trust, then the
218. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
219. Thomas Jefferson once famously proposed that trial jurors be elected by voters from
small districts, a proposal that would have had not entirely dissimilar effects. See, e.g.,
Daniel D. Blinka, Jefferson and Juries: The Problem of Law, Reason, and Politics in the
New Republic, 47 Am. J. of Legal Hist. 35, 100 (2005). Such a proposal is far more radical
than the one proposed here, in light of intervening developments with the jury, such as
particular constitutionalized selection requirements developed through interpretation of the
Sixth Amendment. Jefferson was writing at a time when the jury had discretion to decide
questions of law, a power that is now mostly denied it. See id. at 44-46, 98-99.
220. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of
Law, 30 Crime and Justice 283 (2003).
221. Id. See generally Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge:
An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 583
(2005).
222. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) ("[T]he institution of the jury raises
the people itself, or at least a class of citizens, to the bench of judicial authority .... [It]
invests the people, or that class of citizens, with the direction of society .... [The jury]
invests each citizen with a kind of magistracy; it makes them all feel the duties which they
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criminal justice system ought to seek to maximize inclusion among those
communities in which trust is lowest. Likewise, forcing members of the
affected community to share the decision as to whether to indict will locate
important decisions about law enforcement within the community itself.
Members of such communities who serve on grand juries may come away
with a fuller appreciation of the law enforcement function, possibly making
them better citizens.
If each of the virtues served by citizen participation is focused, at bottom,
on insuring legitimacy for the criminal justice system at the community
level, then such legitimacy is likely to be improved by neighborhood grand
juries. If no indictment could proceed until a grand jury chosen from that
community issued it, the prosecution and law enforcement officials would
necessarily serve less as a focal point for criticism. Restoring this local
democratic element to criminal justice would make it seem more
trustworthy to the community.
On the other hand, if the government treated a community unfairly, the
grand jury would be well situated to make its concerns known. While
declining to indict is one potential option, this is a heavy club that need not
be wielded very often. No prosecutor wants to walk away from a grand
jury with a "no bill"-that constitutes failure. It would be in the interest of
the prosecutor and law enforcement officials to listen to concerns by grand
jurors and take steps to address those concerns. Indeed, prosecutors and
law enforcement officials would presumably be motivated to do so.
3. Increased Power of the Community Relative to the Prosecutor
The neighborhood grand jury model would inevitably have some
ramifications for prosecutorial power. As it stands, the grand jury often
covers such broad jurisdiction that it does not likely feel invested in--or
knowledgeable about-the community where the crime occurred. Each
grand juror is likely to have different interests and none is likely to
necessarily have a very strong interest in any given case. Indeed, some may
feel simply inconvenienced by being required to serve and bored by the
substance of the testimony. These circumstances may heighten the power
of the prosecutor and law enforcement officials in several ways. Such
grand juries are less likely to exercise their own curiosity about
investigations, are more likely to accede to the prosecutorial momentum,
and are perhaps more likely to defer to these law enforcement experts who
know more than any single grand juror about the community in which the
crime occurred.
On the other hand, a grand jury drawn entirely from one community is
more likely to know as much, collectively at least, about the neighborhood
as the prosecutor and law enforcement agents. Moreover, such a grand jury
is likely to be even more interested in crime and criminal justice policy in
are bound to discharge towards society; and the part which they take in the Government."
(alterations omitted) (quoting de Tocqueville, supra note 29, at 334, 337)).
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that neighborhood. Finally, it is also more likely to unite around these
important concerns. Unless the prosecutor resides in the same
neighborhood as the grand jurors, she may be viewed with skepticism. As a
result, the prosecutor may be less successful in making the grand jury her
"handmaiden," to borrow a term from Professor Kuckes.223 Indeed, one
clear way to change the balance of power between the grand jury and the
prosecutor is to tighten up the bonds between the grand jurors so that the
grand jury is emboldened and self-confident.
4. A Color-Blind Solution to Racial Problems in Criminal Justice
To many scholars, the most damning criticisms of criminal justice have
centered on problems of race. To address such problems, many scholars
have focused on solutions designed to achieve racially balanced or racially
representative juries. 224 The solution sketched out here avoids controversial
strategies such as affirmative action based on race, yet yields some of the
same benefits that those strategies might provide. As others have
demonstrated, not all racial problems require race-based solutions.225 In an
era of a "color-blind" Constitution,226 this approach may be attractive.
C. Potential Disadvantages of Neighborhood Grand Juries
The neighborhood grand jury poses some risks that may be troubling in
some contexts. To the extent that the purpose here is to free the
community, as represented by the grand jury, to prefer its own normative
policy judgments over those of a central legislature, one could imagine
certain circumstances in which the grand jury will behave in a manner
inconsistent with rule-of-law values. For example, a grand jury may be less
protective of a suspect who is from outside the local community, and
therefore it might be more inclined to issue an unwarranted indictment.2 27
223. Kuckes, supra note 4, at 2.
224. See generally Alschuler, supra note 201; King, supra note 201.
225. Consider the so-called "Texas 10 Percent Plan" extolled particularly by Professor
Gerald Torres as a "work-around" for the Hopwood decision restricting affirmative action at
the University of Texas. See Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, The Miner's Canary: Enlisting
Race, Resisting Power, Transforming Democracy 69-73 (2002). In seeking to achieve
greater diversity, the University of Texas offered admission not on the basis of race, but on
the basis of status in the top ten percent of the class at any public high school in Texas. Id.
Though this approach did not address race explicitly, it nevertheless had the effect of
producing a more racially balanced class. Id.
226. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States'
Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 267, 360 (2001).
227. Most scholars do not feel that the existing grand jury is very protective of an
innocent defendant in any case. See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text. Those who
hew to the "ham sandwich" metaphor would be hard-pressed to complain about a grand jury
that was too ready to indict. Grand juries already indict in more than ninety-nine percent of
cases. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. Since commentators expect the grand
jury to rubber stamp any indictment presented to it, a defendant would likely be in little
worse position under this proposal. In that sense, this proposal leaves the average criminal
suspect no worse than under the existing regime.
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This might be called the "false positive" effect. Or, on the other hand, a
grand jury may be too protective of the member of the community, and
thereby decline to issue a righteous indictment. This might be called a
"false negative."
These are serious potential problems, and the best way to address them is
perhaps to retain jurisdictionwide grand juries for some offenses and to use
community grand juries primarily for local offenses with local suspects and
local victims. For localized offenses, like most violent offenses, the relative
interest in the offense in the local community is high and the relative
interest by the central authority is low. Thus, the central government has a
much lesser claim to legitimate concern. On the other hand, for offenses
with national or regional impacts, or that cross jurisdictional boundaries, the
central authority has greater legitimacy, and a grand jury with a wider reach
may be more appropriate.
While some may be concerned about a community grand jury's
willingness to issue an unwarranted indictment, others might be troubled by
the potential for the so-called false negative, that is, the grand jury's refusal
to indict an obviously guilty defendant. This is the concern that raises the
specter of "nullification" for some scholars and implicates rule-of-law
concerns.
In some cases, a false negative will presumably reflect a disagreement
with a state or national law because the local community elevates its own
cultural standards over the behavioral standard set by law. Indeed, in some
cases, the so-called "false negative" will constitute a community veto of a
criminal prosecution of an offender in the community. Since the grand jury
represents the same community that will presumably have to live with the
offender in its midst if there is no prosecution, the grand jury's refusal to
indict will reflect a profound statement by the community. The grand jury
will bear accountability for that decision.228 Indeed, if the suspect is truly
blameworthy, it is the members of the community, including the members
of the grand jury, who will bear the consequences of the release of that
suspect back into the community.
To some degree, such an outcome can be justified by common notions of
self-determination. The neighborhood grand jury could help address the
difficult issues raised by the controversial notion of a "cultural defense." 229
If the neighborhood grand jury can effectively screen a case through its own
228. Some scholars suggest that nullification, in the jury context, is useless as a political
protest because it is an ambiguous act; the jury could have acquitted for a variety of reasons.
See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 64, at 301; Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based
Jury Nullification: A Response to Professor Butler, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 109, 122 n.52 (1996).
For nullification to be effective as a protest, however, it is really only prosecutors and law
enforcement who need to hear the message. If a grand jury refuses to indict, a prosecutor
will make it his business to find out why. Thus, as a protest, nullification is likely to be
highly effective with the appropriate audience.
229. Some of the difficult issues related to cultural defenses are set forth in Elaine M.
Chiu, Culture as Justification, Not Excuse, 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1317, 1320-21 (2006).
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community's cultural lens, then the need for a cultural defense at trial may
be lessened.
Racially divided communities could provide challenges to the
neighborhood grand jury model. In the South during the civil rights era,
there were dozens of cases involving homicides of African Americans in
which indictments were handed down, but trial juries failed to convict.230
In recent years, federal and state prosecutors have reinstituted prosecutions
against some of the suspects in those cases. 231 The failure of the criminal
justice system to provide justice to black crime victims in the South in the
1960s reveals some of the limits of using the criminal justice system to
achieve social change, or even to support those who are seeking positive
change. 232 That it was rarely the grand jury that posed the problem in those
cases, though, is telling. In most respects, the neighborhood grand jury
model would likely have little ill effects.
While it is generally true that racial prejudices may be stronger in
individual localized communities, many of the most shocking cases of
injustice in the South in the 1960s involved violent acts done in African
American neighborhoods, in homes and churches. In those cases, a
neighborhood grand jury may have been even more responsive than the
existing grand juries were. Since grand juries tended to behave responsibly
in the South in the 1950s and '60s, we can be reasonably sure that
neighborhood grand juries would be responsible today. The grand jury in a
mixed-race community might well mediate some of the racial conflict in
that community. Moreover, no criminal prosecution is ever instituted
unless a prosecutor investigates the case and presents it to the grand jury. If
a prosecutor could get an existing grand jury to "indict a ham sandwich,"
surely she can use her persuasive powers in some fashion in the
neighborhood grand jury. Prosecutors can cloak themselves in moral
authority, and frequently do. We can expect that the prosecutor who stands
before the grand jury will encourage the grand jury to do "the right thing,"
even in cases in which community prejudices run high. Indeed, increasing
the trust between the prosecutor and the community is one of the benefits of
the neighborhood grand jury proposal.
Furthermore, the general impact of a false negative is weak. The grand
jury's ability to guard and preserve community norms of criminal justice is,
in some senses, very limited and easily circumscribed. The only real action
available to the grand jury is obstruction. A determined prosecutor may
230. Anthony V. Alfieri, Retrying Race, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1141, 1159-66 (2003).
231. See id.
232. See Margaret M. Russell, Reopening the Emmitt Till Case: Lessons and Challenges
for Critical Race Lawyering, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 2101, 2117-20 (2005).
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present the same case to the same grand jury again in the future 233 or to a
succeeding grand jury in hopes of obtaining an indictment. 234
Judging from the conventional historical narrative of the grand jury,
however, the use of discretion seems to be a primary raison d'8tre of the
grand jury. While the grand jury's exercise of discretion might undermine
the rule of law,235 and it could be used for purposes that people outside the
community would call illegitimate, the very existence of the grand jury
suggests that a felony may not be prosecuted legitimately in any community
until the local community effectively approves it through issuance of a
grand jury indictment. In other words, while a criminal law exists formally
when the state or national legislature enacts it, it is not enforceable until the
local prosecutor and the local community approves its application in any
particular case. While this model occasionally will produce an unfortunate
result, it is a fundamental assumption of American constitutional justice that
it is not the community that should be feared, but rather it is the government
and the threat of abuse of governmental authority. Indeed, the remedy for
problems related to racial discrimination in the South was not to lessen the
community role in criminal justice but to increase its role, through the jury,
just as suggested here. 236
Does the neighborhood grand jury model potentially dilute the rule of
law by increasing the uncertainty as to which crimes will be indicted?
Absolutely. But it does not dilute the rule of law any more than the
principle that a law can only be enforced if a violation can be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt and with a unanimous jury verdict. The effect of
both procedural rules is to sacrifice rule-of-law values for other equally
important values, such as the presumption of innocence and the moral
legitimacy that follows from relative certainty that punishment is deserved.
In general, the neighborhood grand jury, as guided by a prosecutor, is
likely to follow the law in most cases. While occasionally a grand jury may
behave in a dysfunctional fashion or act for illegitimate reasons, the system
233. United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 413 (1920); Kuckes, supra note 4, at 32
("The federal prosecutor is entirely free ... to seek approval of the same indictment from a
different panel."); id. at 49 ("[E]ven if the grand jurors disagree with the prosecutor about
whether to indict, the prosecutor can always have the last word.").
234. If community grand juries are unwilling to indict in such cases, and justice fails to
materialize for the victims of such offenses, the recent prosecutions in the South remind us
that no one may be able to remain beyond the reach of law and justice forever. While a
defendant may be effectively insulated from prosecution for a violent act temporarily, such
protection could vanish as the racial demographics of the neighborhood change. In other
words, the defendant will remain potentially subject to "retrospective justice," such as that
which has happened in the South in recent years. The term is borrowed from Margaret
Russell, who discusses the propriety of prosecuting old cases of racial violence, such as the
murder of Medgar Evers. Margaret M. Russell, Cleansing Moments and Retrospective
Justice, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1225, 1226-27 (2003).
235. See, e.g., Leipold, supra note 3, at 309-10.
236. See generally Nancy J. King, Duncan v. Louisiana: How Bigotry in the Bayou Led
to Federal Regulation of State Juries, in Criminal Procedure Stories 261 (Carol Steiker ed.,
2006) (explaining the development of the application of the Sixth Amendment to require
juries in state proceedings and the broader context of Duncan v. Louisiana).
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must be designed to function in a manner that works well in the vast
majority of cases, not in the highly unusual cases. In most cases, if
succeeding grand juries refuse to indict, then that refusal may well be a
righteous manifestation of local popular sovereignty.
D. The Neighborhood Grand Jury Vis-6- Vis Other Reforms
If the justification for the neighborhood grand jury is legitimate, then
many of the other proposals for grand jury reform are wide of the mark. If
the grand jury is intended to serve a political or policy function, not a
factual or adjudicative function, then the grand jury does not necessarily
need to be presented with facts in a more formalized fashion in each
individual case. 237
Likewise, constructing the grand jury entirely of lawyers with special
expertise, as Professor Leipold has suggested,238  would be
counterproductive because it would undermine the populist nature of the
institution. Indeed, the real value of the grand jury is in representing local
interests, not in offering specialized expertise. After all, a judge could
provide much more specialized expertise than a jury.239  Indeed, if
Professor Leipold's argument is correct, then perhaps members of Congress
and state legislators should also be required to be attorneys. That cannot be
SO.
On the other hand, some proposals for reform are consistent with the
quasi-political nature of the grand jury and ought to be reconsidered.
Perhaps the grand jury ought to be informed, for example, about the range
of punishment that might apply in any given case.240 If the grand jury has
the responsibility to consider whether it should apply a given law within its
community by considering broader questions about the fairness of a law,
then such information may be relevant in a grand jury's deliberations.
Likewise, the notion that grand jury indictment ought not be waivable, as
suggested by Professor Roger Fairfax, may be more compelling once we
see the importance of the community's role in prosecutions. 241
One common concern about the proposal expressed here is that the cost
of implementing such a proposal may be too high. There are ways to limit
the costs, however. Given the number of public institutions, such as
libraries and community centers, in many jurisdictions, however, there may
237. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 6, at 24 (suggesting that suspects be allowed to
testify in certain cases).
238. Leipold, supra note 3, at 264 (stating that the primary cause of the grand jury's
failure to screen prosecutorial decisions effectively is the jurors' lack of competence to
perform their task).
239. This is why judicial review of prosecutorial charges, through the information and
preliminary hearing process, cannot achieve the same level of legitimacy that a grand jury
can offer. Simmons, supra note 6, at 75 (noting that the grand jury provides the criminal
justice system with a critical input of real-life experience and thereby helps to provide
legitimacy).
240. See Tomer, supra note 48, at 87-88.
241. See generally Fairfax, supra note 50.
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already be adequate infrastructure to return instruments of justice to the
community in this way. Prosecutors may need to "ride circuit" in some
sense, but this need not be an overwhelming expense and it may be well
justified by the outcomes of having a prosecutor more familiar with the
community for which she works. Court reporters are commonly used, but
electronic recording of sessions may be appropriate in some lighter venues.
In short, though criminal justice is an enormously expensive undertaking,
this proposal need not increase costs substantially.
CONCLUSION
The grand jury has the potential to help restore greater legitimacy to
criminal justice in the United States. It must first be restored itself,
however, so that it will be able to serve, as it once did, as the voice of the
community. Because criminal justice is a local endeavor with primarily
local effects, the local community must be involved much more
substantially in its processes. Citizen participation in criminal justice must
be fostered, but not in a way that dilutes diversity and drowns the voices of
minority communities. The grand jury ought to be an institution where
local communities can make themselves heard.
The grand jury indeed requires reform, though in the way it is
constructed, not necessarily in the way it functions. In a highly segregated
society, the grand jury should not reflect a much diluted diversity based on
the entire jurisdiction and should instead be constructed so that it carefully
represents a real community. The most expedient way to match the grand
jury to the community is to dramatically decrease the geographic scope of
the community from which the grand jury is drawn. Each neighborhood
should have a grand jury that can serve as its voice in criminal justice and
exercise the powers that justified inclusion of the grand jury in the Bill of
Rights and in several state constitutions.
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